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CHAPTER I. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 The Problem 
The agricultural sector in almost all the countries is characterized by 
substantial government intervention (USDA, 1990; OECD, 1991). Governments in 
various countries implement markedly different food and agricultural policies 
resulting in sharply contrasted patterns of protection. A predominant pattern of 
government involvement across countries in agriculture is that while producers are 
subsidized in industrialized countries, developing countries tend to tax their 
agricultural sector (Olson, 1985 and 1988; de Gorter and Tsur, 1990; Anderson and 
Tyers, 1989; de Janvry, 1983; Bale and Lutz, 1981; Binswanger and Scandizzo, 1983). 
On the other hand, food commodities are generally overpriced and are relatively 
expensive in industrialized countries (Schultz, 1978) while developing countries strive 
to provide food at substantially lower prices to consumers (Balisacan and 
Rournasset, 1987; Byerlee and Sain, 1986; Peterson, 1979; Lutz and Scandizzo, 1980). 
There has been a growing interest in identifying and analyzing the patterns of 
agricultural protection (Lee, 1989; Paarlberg, 1989; Gardner, 1989; and Collins 1989). 
Econometric evidence for patterns of overall agricultural protection, within or across 
selected industrialized or newly industrialized countries are available in Anderson and 
Hayami (1986), Honma and Hayami (1986), Gardner (1987), and Yamauchi and 
Kwon (1989). However, studies examining this pattern across industrialized and 
developing countries are relatively few (for instance, Balisacan and Roumasset) and 
have been less satisfactory in their explanation of cross-country variation in 
protection levels (Herrmann, 1989; Gautam and Chaudhary, 1992). 
Most of the earlier work have not concentrated on a product-specific approach 
to agricultural protection and have rather focused on an aggregate approach to total 
agricultural protection. Protection levels vary significantly across agricultural 
commodities (Herrmann; Olson, 1986). For instance, while producers of rice and 
2 
wheat are taxed in India, rapeseed and peanut growers are provided subsidies. Thus, 
a product-specific approach seems necessary (Herrmann; Gautam et al., 1991; and 
USDA, 1988). 
Moreover, the coverage of the determinants of agricultural protection has also 
been limited in earlier studies. While Honma and Hayami considered the impact of 
industrialization and economic growth, Anderson and Tyers (1989) and Balisacan and 
Rournasset determfoe a correlation between agricultural protection and per capita 
national income, and Herrmann studied the impact of economic development and 
import dependence on wheat protection in wheat importing countries. 
The present study is more comprehensive in terms of its coverage of the 
patterns of protection as it also concentrates on demand characteri tics of individual 
commodities, regional patterns of protection, importance of the commodity in daily 
diet, Engel coefficient, instability of production and food security issues. Since the 
source of producer support are taxpayers and consumers (Blandford, 1990), 
examination of the influence of these factors on agricultural protection seems 
pertinent. However, the study of determination of agricultural protection from 
consumers' point of view has largely been ignored or studied in isolation (Balisacan 
and Roumasset; and Byerlee and Sain). 
Earl ier studies have used variations of nominal protection rate (NPR) as a 
measure of agricultural protection level. However, direct price comparisons between 
farm prices and border prices, used in the computation of NPRs, do not include 
government subsidies such as deficiency payments and other direct support measures 
(USDA, 1990). NPR estimates fail to measure the full extent of intervention (Josling 
and Tangermann, 1989). In order to overcome this problem, this study would use the 
Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents (PSE and CSE), the more 
comprehensive and flexible measures of the level of protection that attempt to 
capture transfers occasioned by price and non-price policies made to domestic 
producers and consumers through government policies (Josling and Tangermann; 
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Schiff, 1989; and Blandford, 1990). A comparative analysis for these different 
measures of protection, along with their policy coverage, is also provided at the 
beginning of the next section. 
1.2 Purpose of the Study 
In this study an attempt would be made to identify some consistent and 
regular patterns of agricultural protection in a commodity specific as well as in an 
aggregate approach. The specific protection patterns for some individual 
commodities are highly sensitive to changes in the explanatory variables studied as 
compared to the overall agricultural protection. Some regional patterns may also be 
observed in the protection awarded to specific agricultural commodities as well as to 
the whole agricultural sector. Although such patterns are tremendously complex and 
are also influenced by unique country-specific characteristics, in order to be able to 
economically theorize such patterns, it is imperative to identify the most consistent 
and regular among these that are prevalent across countries. Therefore, unlike most 
of the earlier works, the scope of this study would include both industrialized as well 
as developing countries and compare and contrast their protectionistic patterns. The 
influence of demand characteristics of commodities on these patterns would also be 
studied. A more comprehensive measure of the level of intervention would be 
adopted that can measure both direct and indirect transfers to agricultural producers 
and consumers. 
Moreover, the patterns of agricultural protection would be studied irt isolation 
with regard to the influence of individual facto.rs to facilitate improved 
comprehension of such patterns. However, the focus of this attempt is not an in-
deptb analysis of individual patterns but rather identification of some regular patterns 
especially in the consumer protection levels. 
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1.3 Scope of the Study 
The study uses the data on producer subsidy equivalents and consumer subsidy 
equivalents as well as on a number of explanatory variables for the period 1982-87. 
The analysis is performed for the agricultural sector as a whole as well as for 
individual commodities like wheat, rice and milk, for 32 industrialized and developing 
countries: Argentina, Australia , Ausrria, Bangladesh, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, 
EC-JO, Egypt, Finland, India, Indonesia, Japan, Kenya, Mexico, Nigeria, New Zealand, 
Norway, Pakistan, Poland, South Africa, South Korea, Sweden, Switzerland, Taiwan, 
Thailand, Turkey, United States, U.S.S.R. and Yugoslavia. However, data limitations 
on the dependent variables (PSE and CSE) restricted the analysis to selected 
countries for specific commodities. The data on PSE and CSE were collected form 
USDA (1990, and 1991) and OECD (1991). There are some differences in these two 
sets of PSE and CSE estimates, but they are broadly comparable (Blandford). The 
PSEs and CSEs for all commodities are weighted averages of a commodity bundle 
according to their respective producer values. The commodities included in a 
commodity bundle vary across countries due to lack of availability of information.' 
The averages used in the graphical analysis are simple averages over the period 
covered. The data on independent variables were collected from various is ue of 
International Financial Statistics, World Development Repon, and FAO Food Balance 
Sheers. The exchange rates for domestic currencies of different countries are adjusted 
exchange rates for countries with exchange rate distortion policies.2 
The results are presented in the form of graphical, tabular and empirical 
estimations. The graphical analysis is based upon average values for the period 1982-
87. The regression analysis does not include U.S.S.R. since the data was available 
I 
For more details, sec USDA, ERS {1990), Estimares of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87. 
2 
Sec footnote above. Exchange rates used in Lhc calculation of PSEs and CSEs ror OECD countries are provided in OECD 
(1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy EquivalenLS and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. 
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only for 1986. The empirical estimation uses ordinary least squares technjque fo r the 
pooled cross-section and time-series regression analysis. However, it must be 
cautioned that some of the explanatory variables used in this analysis are not really 
independent of the dependent variable. Also, there may exist some collinearity 
among some of the explanatory variables. Considering the possibili ty of bias due to 
the problems of simultaneity and collinearity, the results of the regression analysis 
must be interpreted with caution. The analysis on identification of protectionistic 
patterns is perfo rmed for individual commodities as well as the whole agricultural 
sector with respect to both producers and consumers. 
1.3 Organization of the Study 
The rest of the study is organized into six sections dealing with some 
prominent patterns of agricultural protection. The next section contains the overview 
of these patterns across industrialized and developing countries highlighting some 
general features. A comparative analysis of different measures of protection is also 
provided along with some observable regional patterns of protection. Section III 
focuses on the relationship between the national income aggregates and the level of 
protection. The influence of the import dependence and trade nature of the 
commodity on the protection awarded is documented in Section IV. Cross-country 
protection patterns relating to the demand characteristics of individual commodities 
have been contrasted against the aggregate level of protection in Section V. The 
effect of group size and relative share of agriculture in employment are discussed in 
Section VI. Section VII focuses on the relationship of consumer food security and 
self-sufficiency and production instability issues with protection levels across 
countries. Salient features of the study are summarized in the final section. 
References are provided at the end of the manuscript. 
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CHAPTER Il. GENERAL PATTERN OF AGRICULTURALPROTECTION 
ACROSS COUNTRIF.S 
11.1 The Measurement for the Level of Protection 
Government intervention in agriculture comes through various policies that 
affect the returns to farmers for their products both directly (including those affecting 
inputs and outputs) and indirectly (which are economy-wide policies such as exchange 
rate manjpulations) (Krueger, 1989). Any particular commodity may be affected by a 
number of different agricultural programs. To study the overall level of intervention, 
therefore, the aggregate measure of protection employed should be capable of 
combining the effects of diverse policies on the commodity (Schwartz and Parker, 
1988). Different studies have used alternative measures with different meanings, uses 
and degrees of complexjty in an attempt to determine the actual level of protection 
(Josling and Tangermann, 1989). 
Of these different indicators, the most simple and commonly used (for 
example, Honma and Hayami, 1986; Balisacan and Roumasset) is the nominal rate of 
protection (NRP) or the Nominal Protection Coefficient (NPC). A relatively more 
accurate but complex measure od protection is the Effective Rate of Protection 
(ERP). However, since the publication of Corden's (1966) paper, the stringent 
information requirements in using ERP as a measure of protection have led to the 
development of alternative proxjes like the producer subsidy equivalent (PSE), a 
measure that has recently received particular attention in the political sphere, such as 
the General Agreement on Tariff and Trade (GATT) (USDA, 1990; OECD, 1991; 
Landes; Josling and Tangermann). The PSE, which was initially introduced by 
Josling (FAO), is being adopted on an ongoing basis in OECD and USDA and also 
in international trade forums. These alternative measures of protection, along with 
their relative strengths and weaknesses, are discussed below. 
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11.1.1 Definitions of alternative measures of agricultural protection 
Table 1 provides mathematical formulas and the types of pol icies covered for 
some alternative measures of protection like the NPC, NPR, ERP, PSE, NPRC 
(Nominal Rate of Protection for Consumers) and CSE (Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents). The NPC is defined as the ratio of domestic prices to border prices 
(converted to domestic currency) while the NPR measures the protection level by 
calculating prices received by domestic producers as a percentage of border prices. 
NPR measures how output prices received by domestic producers ch.ange in response to 
government policies. NPRC, on the other band, measures the consumer protection 
levels by taking the percentage difference between the domestic consumer price and 
the border price. It records how market price for consumes are altered by border 
measures (Schwartz and Parker). However, NPC, NPR and NPRC accurately 
measure the policy effects at the output level only (Josling and Tangermann). 
Intervention in the input market, such as taxes and subsidies on intermediate and 
primary inputs, as well as other output policies such as direct transfers to producers 
(deficiency payments), are not captured by these measures. As Schwartz and Parker 
point out, these measures are only partial indications of how intervention policies 
influence domestic production. 
The effective rate of protection (ERP), on the other hand, is a better measure 
of the level of protection since it considers the joint effects of input and output 
policies on the value added (Carden, 1971; Josling and Tangermann). ERP is 
calculated as the percentage difference in the unit value added at domestic prices and 
at border prices, converted into the domestic currency (Lutz and Scandizzo). Thus 
ERP would capture the effects of a subsidy on an intermediate input that might 
distort the supply and prices of the final commodity. In case of agriculture, the 
superiority of ERP over NPR is most apparent in sectors such as grain-fed livestock. 
In this sense, the ERP may be a useful tool to analyze the resource misallocation 
among various sectors of an economy. However, a number of policies, such as 
8 
Table 1: Alternative Measures of Agricultural Protection 
Policy Coverage 
Output Other Primary lnterm. Consu- Consumer 
Border Price Output Input Input mer Taxes 
Measure' Definition\ Policies Policies Policies" Policies Policies Prices and 
Subsidies 
P rod ucer Protection 
NPC PD I e PW x x 
/\'PR {PD - e P w } I e P w x x 
ERP {VA - e VAw } / e VAw X x x 
P E 
Q (PD - e P., ) + D t I x x x x x 
Q • PD+ D 
Consumer Protection 
NPRC {PC - e P w } / e P., x x 
CSE 
Q (PC - c P., ) + DC x x x 
Q • PC + DC 
a The measures fo r p rotection refer to a single agricultural commodiiy. NPC: Nominal Protection Coefficient; !\'PR: Nominal 
Protection Rate; ERP: Effective Rate or Protection; PSE: Producer Subsidy Equivalent; NPRC: Nominal Protection Rate for 
Consumers; CSE: Consumer Subsidy Equivalents. 
b PD: Domestic Producer Price; P., : World Price (in world currency units), which is same as the border price of the 
commodity; e: exchange rate conversio n factor; VA: Value Added at Domestic Prices; VA,_: Value Added at Wo rld Prices; Q: 
Domestic Output of the Commodity; 0 : Direct Government Payme nts to Domestic Producers; I: Indirect Transfers to Producers 
(e.g., input subsid ies, market assistance etc.); PC: Domestic Consumer Price; DC: Direct and/ or Indirect Payments to Do mestic 
Consumers. 
c Other Output Policies are defined as policies ....;th ambiguous and/ or disproponionate price effects. 
Sources: USDA, ERS (1990), Producer and Consuml!T Subsidy Equivalenrs: 1982-87; Schwartz, N. E. and S. Parker (1988), 
•Measuring Government Intervention in Agriculture fo r the GAIT Negotiations· American Journal of AgnC11lrural Econonucs, 10 
(5): ll37-l145: Josling, T. and S. Tangermann ( 1989), •Measuring Levels of Protection in Agriculture: A Survey o f Approaches 
and Results,· in Allen Maunder and Alben o Valdes (eds.) Agriculture and Govmsmenrs in an lntl!Tdependent World. Aldershot: 
Gower Publislung Company; Lutz, E. and P. L Scandizro (1980), •Price Disto n ions in Developing Countries: A Bias Against 
Agriculture·, European Review of Agricultural Economics, 7: 5-27; Sigman, D. (1985), Food Policies and Food Sectlriry Under 
lnsrabiliry: Modeling and Analysis, Lexington, MA: D.C. lle11 th and Company. 
investment subsidy for agriculture, that do not affect the value added are not 
incorporated in ERP calculations. Thus, ERP may not provide a complete picture of 
all policy-induced output distortions (Josling and Tangermann). Moreover, 
information requirements for calculating ERP are quite stringent since ERP 
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calculations involve estimating NPR for the final com"Tlodity, NPRCs for all 
intermediate inputs, and technical information on input-output coefficients, which are 
notoriously difficult to obtain on a representative basis (Schwartz and Parker). 
PSE and CSE, on the other hand, have received increased attention recently, 
especially in the Uruguay round of trade negotiations. These measures provide a 
more comprehensive and flexible means of determining the level on intervention that 
attempt to capture effects price and non-price policies on producers and consumers, 
respectively. Josling and Tangermann define PSE as the level of (per-unit) producer 
subsidy necessary to replace the group of actual farm policies adopted by a particular 
country in order to leave unchanged the farm incomes. The calculations for CSE are 
symmetric to those for the PSE, except that the USDA, ERS calculations make no 
distinctions between direct and indirect payments to consumers. While a positive 
PSE for a commodity implies a favorable intervention in that case, a negative PSE 
generally indicates taxing of the producers of that commodity. Similarly, a subsidy to 
consumers would yield a positive CSE, a negative value of CSE would imply a tax on 
domestic consumers. Unlike the nominal rate of protection measure, the PSE and 
consumer subsidy equivalents (CSE) capture both the transfers from government 
expenditures and effects of policies such as import quotas that transfer incomes from 
domestic consumers to producers. PSEs, and their consumer counterpart, CSEs, 
provide the useful policy data set for a model of international agricultural markets 
used in examining government intervention (Chattin, 1989). 
Throughout this study the PSE and CSE are used as the measurements of 
protection level. Although these measures are not perfect (for instance, countries 
could switch from less trade distorting to more trade distorting policies without 
affecting their aggregative measures of support, they provide a convenient, reasonably 
comprehensive and flexible means of summarizing policy interventions across 
countries taJcing into account both direct and indirect impacts of such interventions 
(Josling and Tangerrnann). 
10 
11.1.2 Comparative analysis of alternative measures of protection 
Since each of the measures of agricultural protection discussed above take jnto 
account different price and income effects, they also measure the level of intervention 
diffe rently. Discussed below are four different scenarios where government policies 
differ in their scope so as to compare the estimates from these different measures of 
protection. First, it is assumed that the intervention affects only the domestic 
producer price of output where in case (i) domestic price is assumed to be above the 
world price level while in case (ii) the domestic price is assumed to be lower than the 
world price. The third case incorporates lump sum payments, or input subsidies, to 
farmers which do not directly affect the domestic price of output which is assumed to 
be higher than the world price. In case (iv), effects of an import quota are measured 
and compared using these measures of protection. 
Case (i): 
Consider a country where domestic supply and demand are given by D 1 and S1• 
Suppose that due to direct price intervention, the domestic price of commodity Q is 
kept at Pd, such that domestic output is Q., while the world price is at Pw. There 
are no other distortions, such as direct payments (D) or input subsidies (I), such that 
D +I = 0. In this case the NPR estimate, as well as the ERP estimate, would be: 
Q p -QP 
NPR=ERP • d • w 
Q.Pw 
or, in terms of Figure 1, 
The estimate for PSE, in the absence of any direct payments or input subsidies, 
would also be similar except that the denominator would be different, that is, 
11 
PSE- Q.P[Q.Pw OQ.CPd- OQ.KPw PwKCPd 
Q.Pd OQ.CPd OQ.CPd 
These different estimates may be compared with conventional Marshal lian 
producer surplus (PS) measures. The change in producer and consumer surpl us (CS) 
due to the policy, from Figure 1, are A PS = + P ... BCP d ; A CS = - P ..,LCP d ; and 
there would be net loss to the society equal to the area BLC. To facilitate the 
comparison of producer surplus measure with these other measures of protection 







Figure 1: Comparison of alternative measures of protection 
under output pricing policy 
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change at (i) border value using the base of NPR (which would also be same fo r 
ERP), and (ii) market value using base of PSE: 
It is evident, therefore, that both NPR/ ERP and PSE overestimate the protection 
levels as compared to their respective producer surplus estimates. However, PSE 
underestimates the producer surplus at border prices whereas NPR (and ERP) 




Thus, NPR and ERP, in the absence of direct payment or input subsidy 
programs, overestimate the effects of intervention as compared to PSE. 
Case (ii): 
Now consider the case of a country where domestic price, Pd , is below the 
world price level, P w' . With supply curve S1 and demand curve D 1 , the output, given 




OQ.CPd-OQ.NP,.. - PdCNPw 
NPR=ERP= = • 
I I 
OQ.NP,.. OQ.NP,.. 
The PSE estimates, in this case, would be: 
OQ CP -OQ NP 1 P CNP
1 
PSE= • d • w = - d w 
OQ.CPd OQ.CPd 
Since the denominator is smaller in case of PSE as compared to NRP, therefore, PSE 
estimate would be greater than both NPR and ERP. The change in Marshallian 
producer surplus, consumer surplus and net societal effects, in this case, are: -
P w' RCPd ; P w' MCPd ; and the area MCR respectively (Figure 1). Converting the 
change in producer surplus in percent of border and market prices and comparing 
them with NPR, ERP and PSE estimates, we get: 
Note that NRP, ERP, PSE and PS are all negative indicating a tax on 
domestic producers. The comparison above shows that all these measures 
underestimate the level of percent change in producer surplus. However, PSE would 
overestimate the change in producer surplus at border prices while NPR and ERP 
would still underestimate it at market prices. That is, 





Consider a price-jnduced income transfe r to producers that wou ld decrease the 
prices. Let the initial supply curve be S and demand curve be D 1 with corresponding 
output at Q 1 (Figure 2). Now, suppose that the government makes a price-induced 
income to farmers such that D ~ O; and let I still be zero, for simplicity. 111is shifts 
the supply curve to the right to S1 increasing the output to Q •. The per unit subsidy 
then would be (D + I)/ Q •. The NRP estimates in this case would be 
The estimate for PSE would, however, include the direct payments and would be 
PSE= Q.Pd-Q.P w +Q.(D+l) = OQ.CPd-OQ.KP w +P ~EP0 = P wCKPd+PdC£p0 = P ...,KEP0 
Q.Pd+Q.D OQ.CPd+PdCEPO OQ.CPd+P ~EPO OQ.EPO 
The numerator for PSE is larger than that for NPR by the term PdCEP0 , whereas the 
denornfoator for PSE is larger than the NPR by PdCEP0 + P ...,KCPJ. Therefore, the 
estimate of PSE would be smaller than that of NPR. Note that ERP estimates would 
be similar to that of NPR if the subsidy provided does not affect the value of 
intermediate input. Otherwise, the estimates for NPR and ERP would J iff er since 
ERP would include effects of any policy affecting the value added of the intcrmccH:.ite 
inputs. 
The estimates of producer and consumer surplus and cost to the government 
of the policy are: A PS = TNGC - PJGFP1 ; A CS = PdCFP1 = PdGFP1 + GFC; and 




0 QI Q* 
Figure 2: Comparison of alternative measures of protection under 
price-inducing transfers 
producer surplus. Therefore, whether the society as a whole gains or looses from this 
policy depends upon whether TNGC+GFC greater than or less than PdCEP0 • The 
next case deals with the impacts of an import quota that facilitates further 
comparison among these different measures. 
Case (iv) : 
The ensuing discussion follows the framework developed by Schwartz and 
Parker (1988) where they examine the effects of an import quota on domestic 
production, consumption and prices in an attempt to compare the alternative 
measures of protection. Consider a country that imports the good Q. The domestic 
production is Q1 , and the country imports the quantity Q1Q4 so as to facilitate 
domestic consumption of Q 4 (Figure 3). The world price P w prevails in the domestic 
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economy. Now, suppose that an import quota equal to 0 20 3 is imposed. Thi rai es 
domestic prices to Pd , increases the domestic output to 0 2 and decreases the 
domestic consumption by the amount 0 30 4• The trade distortion resulting from the 
quota will be P ...,Pd . 
The producer and consumer surplus and the net welfare measures associated 
with this quota will be P...,AHPd ; - P...,FGPd; and -(ACH+EFG), respectively. The 
area CEGH represents the tran fe rs to the holders of the quota rights. 
The NRP and PSE estimates and their relationship, in this case, would be: 
Comparing these estimates with percent producer surplus at border and market 
prices, respectively, we get: 
NPR>PS(%) IBorderPrice.?PSE 
NP R> PSE> PS(%) I MarketJ>ricu· 
In order to calculate the estimates of ERP, assume that S1 is the undistorted supply 
curve for, say, livestock which uses feed grains as an intermediate input. Suppose 
that livestock producers are now given an input subsidy which lowers their feed grains 
costs by the amount CH. This would shift the supply curve for .livestock to the right 
to S2 , thus increasing the domestic output to 0 2 and reducing imports by 0 10 2• 
Since consumer prices are not affected, the domestic consumption does not change. 
In this case, the value added for the final output (livestock) is subsidized equivalent 
to the area P ...,CHPd and, hence, would be taken into consideration for calculating 
ERP. However, since domestic producer prices and consumer prices remain same, 
NRP would not capture this subsidy, and hence, ERP provides a better measure of 
how government policies influence price incentives for producers. PSE estimates, on 
17 
01 
Qt Q2 Q3 
Figure 3: Comparison of alternative measures of protection under import quota 
the other hand, would be approximately equal to those of ERP in case of an 
intermediate input subsidy. However, PSE would overestimate producer incentives, 
as compared to ERP, in case of an intermediate input tax. 
In short, then, PSE would provide better measurement of distortions where 
policies include import quota, export taxes, import subsidies, domestic producer 
subsidies and taxes etc. However, in case of government policies which do not affect 
prices, the link between PSE and trade distortions becomes uncertain. Schwartz and 
Parker argue that one reason for this is that PSE measures the effects of farm 
programs by the level of government expenditure, which may bear little relationship 
to its effects on trade distortions. The unit cost of government expenditure would not 
18 
necessarily match how these kind of policies affect prices. For example, a policy with 
an overall cost equal to P ....,CHPd might shift out the supply curve only by IB - from S, 
to S3 . Such a policy would yield a price effect of only P ,.,Pd ' with the associated 
price-induced income effect of P ,..BIPd ' . Part of the rest of the government 
expenditure may reflect a lump-sum transfer to producers or may not have any effect 
on producers at all. In this case, PSE would overstate the effects of goverrunent 
intervention.3 
An overview of some of the prominent patterns of agricultural protection 
across industrialized and developing countries is provided in the next section. 
II.2 An Overview or Patterns or International Agricultural Protection 
Most industrialized and developing countries have adopted various policies for 
specific commodities that directly and indirectly affect the returns to agricultural 
producers (Krueger). A general comparison of protection levels across industrialized 
and developing countries reveals a three tier pattern of government intervention. 
While, in general, industrialized countries tend to favor agricultural producers, the 
taxation of agriculture is widespread among poorest developing countries. Among 
industrialized countries, on the other hand, while traditional food exporters like the 
U.S.A., New Zealand, Australia and Canada also support their agricultural sector, the 
level of protection is relatively higher in case of food importers like J apan, as well as 
the newly industrialized countries of Taiwan and South Korea (Anderson and Tyers) 
(Figure 4). This pattern is contrastingly opposite in case of consumer protection 
levels for industrialized as well as developing countries. While low-income countries 
like India, Pakistan, Nigeria and Kenya support their consumers by availing food at 
subsidized prices, food consumers in industrialized countries often act as a source of 
price supports awarded to their agricultural producers (Blandford, p. 403). 
3 
fo r more details about measurement of this sort of policy cffcctS, sec Schwartz and Parker (1988). 
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Traditional food importers as well as newly industrialized countries heavily tax their 
consumers of agricultural products (Figure 5). 
These patterns of agricultural protection discussed above become even more 
accentuated when we consider a specific agricultural commodity, like wheat, as 
compared to the overall protection levels. As shown in Figure 6, the poorest of the 
developing countries substantially tax their wheat producers while industrialized 
countries protect their wheat farmers. The protection level in industrialized countries 
is relatively higher than the middle income countries like South Africa, Mexico and 
Chile. Protection is highest in case of Japan where the level of PSE for wheat stands 
at almost 100%. Northern European countries like Norway, Finland, Switzerland and 
Sweden protect their wheat sectors more than other industrialized countries 
(Herrmann) and tax their wheat consumers more heavily as shown in Figure 7. 
Wheat consumers in both the low-income (like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nigeria) 
as well as the middle-income countries (like Argentina, Mexico, Poland, South 
Africa), on the other hand, are subsidized. 
The patterns of protection in middle-income countries like South Africa reveal 
that these countries tend to not only subsidize their wheat consumers but also 
subsidize their wheat producers. The source of this support for domestic wheat 
producers and consumers, therefore, lies outside their agricultural sectors, that is, the 
taxation of non-agricultural sector (Mabbs-Zeno and Oommen, 1989). The overall 
patterns of agricultural protection reveal taxation of producers and subsidization of 
consumers in developing countries. Farm producers in industrialized countries are 
generally subsidized while consumer protection tends to be negative indicating 
income transfers away from consumers to producers (Blandford; Mabbs-Zeno and 
Dammen) . 
These contrasted patterns of agricultural protection are also clearly evident 
from Table 2. While countries with higher per capita GNP tend to subsidize their 














































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































rever e is true in the case of consumer . The share of agriculture in GDP and in 
employment, consumption expenditures, import dependency, self-sufficiency and 
dietary patterns are evidently correlated with the producer and consumer protection 
levels. These patterns are analyzed further in the rest of this study. 
11.3 Regional Patterns and Cross-Commodity Policy Effects of Agricultural 
Protection 
The information provided above in Figures 4 through 7 and Table 2 also 
exhibit some regional patterns in agricultural protection across contiguous countries. 
For example, countries in South Asia including India, Pakistan and Bangladesh with 
similar growing conditions, usually tend to pursue similar policies with regard to their 
agricultural sector. Similarly, newly industrialized countries of South Korea and 
Taiwan; Northern European countries of Norway, Finland and Sweden; and North 
American countries like U.S. and Canada seem to follow policies that depict 
comparable patterns of protection. 
To further examine these patterns and to determine the extent of intra-
regional similarity in agricultural protection rates, a multiple regression analysi was 
performed using qualitative variables for regions with contiguous countries of South 
Asia (SASIA) -- which includes India, Pakistan and Bangladesh; East Asia (EASIA) -
- including Japan and South Korea; Northern Europe (NEURO) -- including Finland, 
Norway, Switzerland and Sweden; North America (NAMER) -- including United 
States and Canada; South America (SAMER) -- including Argentina, Brazil and 
Chile· Australasia (AUSTRAL) -- including Australia and New Zealand; and Eastern 
Europe (EEURO) -- including Poland and Yugoslavia. 
The results for explaining wheat producer protection levels show negative 
regional patterns of protection in case of South Asia but positive patterns for the re t 
of the regions (Table 3). The countries included in the South Asian region are 
























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































sectors. India, Pakistan and Bangladesh follow similar policies in case of wheat with 
average Producer Subsidy Equivalents of -34.8, -30.0 and -28.3, respectively. Wheat 
consumer policies in these countries also follow similar pattern. The positive sign of 
South Asian regional dummy with respect to Consumer Subsidy Equivalents for 
wheat displays that these countries tend to subsidize their wheat consumers. 
Similar regional patterns seem to be followed in other groups of countries as 
Table 3: Regional patterns of wheat producer and consumer protection 
Dependent Variable Estim ated Equalions 
PSE Wheat 
11.5158 - 42.5292 SASIA' + 63.0-l78 EASIA' + 51.1092 NEURO. + 33.7308 EEURO' 
(-7.0538) (10.4570) (9.3327) ( 4.8 150) 
+ 26.9900 NAMER' + 23.5800 SA.MER. + 2.0675 AUSTRAL 
(3.8528) (3.9109) (0.2951) 
12.2717 - 43.2850 SASIA' + 62.2920 EA.SIA' + 24.0617 EC .. + 50.3533 NEURO' 
(-6.9063) (9.9390) (2.3809) (8.982~) 
+ 32.9749 EEURO' + 26.2345 NAMER' 
( 4.4464) (3.5377) 
CSE Wheat 
24.7300 + 6.4411 SASIA - 37.7956 EASIA' - 5.i.2300 EC" - 67-6050 NEURO' 
(0.4500) (-2.6404) (-2.4181) (-5.2213) 
- 3.8750 EEURO - 42.5392 NAMER" 
(-0.2318) (-2.5449) 
25.6203 - 38.6858 EASIA' - 55.1203 EC" - 68.4953 NEURO' - 43.4294 NAMER' 
(-2.8747) (-2.5281) (-5.7017) (-2.721-t) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t - values. 
*,** Statist ically different from zero al the 1 % and 5% level of significa nce. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of 
Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer 
Subsidy Equivalems and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1979-90. 
Variables: SASIA, EASIA, EC, NEURO, EEURO, NAMER, SAMER an<l AUSTRA L arc 
dummy variables representing group of countries belonging to South Asia, Easl Asia, European 
Community, Northern E urope, Eastern Europe, North America, South Am.cric:.i and Australasia, 
respectively. 
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well. Traditional wheat exporting countries like United States and Canada tend to 
subsidize their wheat producers and, on the other hand, tax their wheat consumers. 
For example, the level of Producer Subsidy Equivalents in case of these countries is 
40.9 and 36.2, respectively. Strong regional patterns for wheat producer protection 
are also displayed in case of East Asian and EC countries. The models explaining 
producer protection levels are very robust in that the coefficient of determination 
values obtained are very high (0.64 to 0.69). However, the models explaining 
consumer protection levels do not exhibit similar robustness due to some intra-
regional disparities. For example, while wheat consumers in Japan are taxed at a 
rate of 35.3 percent, the newly industrialized countries like South Korea still protect 
their wheat consumers as well, with wheat Consumer Subsidy Equivalents at 14.7 
perce nt. 
Nonetheless, it is worth noting that regional patterns of protection are also 
able to explain the variation in consumer protection levels - something that has been 
ignored in much of the literature so far. The results above show that it may be 
important to specify analytical models incorporating regional characteristics wherever 
appropriate. The cross-country patterns within developing countries are also 
influenced by specific government programs that render these governments an 
important arbitrator role in setting prices of important foodgrains through buying and 
selling. 
1n many developing countries, the government enjoys monopoly and 
monopsony powers to an extent in buying and selling of staple agricultural 
commodities Like wheat. Government agencies control trade in these commodities as 
well as procure these at government regulated market prices through marketing 
boards. For example, the state control of buying wheat at cheaper than the market 
prices in India resulted in an annual loss of $2.28 billfon on an average to the wheat 
producers during 1982-86. The marketing boards in Nigeria affect the producer 
prices for many agricultural crops including wheat, cotton and cocoa. The annual 
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cost to the coca farmers of the intervention was to the tune of $23.41 million during 
the same period. Such policies are also followed in some middle income countries. 
Brazil, for example has marketing boards to conduct the buying and selling of various 
crops while in Mexico, the government purchasing and marketing agency 
(CONASUPO) buys a portion of major crop outputs at prespecified guaranteed 
prices costing wheat producers $11.55 million annually during 1982-86. These polices 
affect both producer and consumer prices of various crops. However, a subsidy to 
one commodity also constitutes an indirect tax on its substitute commodities. 
Consequently, the support provided to one commodity may distort production and 
consumption patterns of not only that crop but also those of its close substitutes. 
Cross-commodity policy effects of government intervention for wheat and rice 
are studied in Table 4. Producer Subsidy Equivalents for rice are regressed against 
those for wheat to determine the correlation between rice and wheat producer 
support policies. The regression results across countries suggest that the protection 
levels for these two commodities move in the same direction. For example, rice 
producers are taxed in India and so are wheat producers while they are both 
subsidized in Japan. The results suggest that rice and wheat policies are significantly 
positively correlated across countries and, hence, it might be difficult to isolate cross 
commodity effects for these two commodities. 
Protection awarded to wheat producers is shown to discourage wheat 
consumption. This may also explain why low-income countries usually keep low 
producer prices of staple food commodities to provide accessibility to people with low 
purchasing-power. However, the wheat producer protection levels are also shown to 
discourage consumption of rice. Since the producer protection levels for wheat and 
rice producers move in the same direction, as discussed above, the decrease in the 
consumption of rice might be explained by the higher producer protection levels 
which result in higher prices of rice. 
The rest of the study makes an attempt to identify and isolate some of these 
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individual patterns of agricultural protection using Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalents for measuring the levels of producer and consumer protection, 
respectively, across industrialized and developing countries. 
Table 4: Cross-commodity policy effects of producer protection levels across 
industrialized and developing countries 
Dependent Variable Estimated EquaLions Ri DF No. of 
Counlries 
PSE Wheat 17.0760 + 0.5442 PSERICE' 0.59 76 u 
(10.3736) 
Wheat Consumption 15642.92 - U7.37 PSEWHEA T' 0.06 160 27 
(-3.2610) 
Rice Consumption 19870.19 - 217.8290 PSEWHEAT' 0.09 94 16 
(-2.9538) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are / - values. 
* Statistically different from zero at the 1 % level of significance. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivale111s: 1982-87 and OECD (1991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalems and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. 
Variables: PSERICE: PSE for Rice; and PSEWHEAT: PSE for Wheat. 
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CHAPTER ID. NATIONAL INCOME AND PATTERNS OF 
AGRICULTURALPROTECTION 
ill.1 GNP per Capita and Protection Patterns 
The patterns of agricultural protection discussed in the previous section 
highlight the issue of relationship between industrialization and protection. The level 
of protection awarded to farmers increases as the country gets richer. Anderson and 
Hayami also observed that countries in South-East Asia and Europe shifted from 
taxing to subsidizing their agricultural sectors in the course of economic development 
and industrialization. Anderson and Tyers also reported a correlation between 
agricultural protection and per capita national income and concluded that the society 
has an income elastic demand for assisting farmers. It has been reported that 
subsidies to farmers increase in countries with higher levels of gross national product 
(GNP) per capita or industrialization while developing countries tend to tax farmers 
(de Gorter and Tsur). 
In trying to understand why poor countries tend to tax agriculture relative to 
manufacturing while rich countries tend to assist farmers, Anderson (1986) stresses 
the need to examine the structural changes that take place in an economy as it grows. 
In a developing country, most of the labor-force is employed in the agricultural sector 
which provides for the imports needed by their fledgling manufacturing sectors by 
providing exportable goods. Taxing the relatively larger agricultural sectors in these 
economies constitutes the main source o revenue for the government. Tbjs 
exploitation of agriculture has also been justified to finance industrialization and 
economic development (ed Gorter and Tsur, 1991). In the process of economk 
development, the comparative advantage shifts away from agriculture to the industrial 
sector, thus resulting in growing demands by farmers in industrialized countries for 
protection (Honma and Hayami). 
Tables 5 and 6 provide income-wise classification of countries according to 
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level of producer and consumer protection for all commodities and wheat, 
respectively. The categorization of protection coefficients into three divisions, high, 
medium and low, is subjective, based upon the income differentials. The 
diagonalization of the tables reveal that the high income countries generally have 
Table 5: Classification of countries according to agricultural producer and 
consumer protection levels : Averages for 1982-87 
PSE AJI Commodities 
More than 35.0 % 
0.0 to 34.9 % 
Less than 0.0 % 
CSE All Commodities 
Less than -35 % 
0.0 to -34.9 % 
More than 0.0 % 





U .SA., New Zealand 
Japan 
U.SA., Canada, EC 
Middle Income 
($1001-6999) 
S. Korea, Mexico, 
Yugoslavia 
Brazil, Poland, Chile 
















Source: USDA, ERS ( 1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87. 
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Table 6: Classification of countries according to wheat producer and 
consumer protection levels: Averages for 1982-87 
PSE 
More than 35.0 % 
0.0 to 34.9 % 
Less than 0.0 % 
CSE 
Less than -35 % 
0.0 to -34.9 % 
More than 0.0 % 
Classification of Countries According to GNP / Capita 
High Income 
( >$7000) 











New Zealand (0.2) 
Middle Income 
($ 1001-6999) 








Chile, S. Korea 
Argentina, S. Africa 
Poland 
Low Income 







Sources: USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equiva/ems: 1982-87; OECD 
(1991) Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalems and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90 . . 
higher levels of producer protection levels and lower (negative) levels of consumer 
protection while the situation is reverse in case of lower income countries. 
Developing countries with a higher GNP per capita (like Brazil, Mexico, Poland, 
Yugoslavia, S. Africa, Turkey, and Chile) tend to have also positive producer support 
overall as well as for wheat as compared to other developing countries with lower 
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GNP per capita (Like India, Bangladesh, Pakistan, Egypt, China Kenya and Nigeria). 
An exception to this is Argentina, a middle income developing country, that tends to 
tax its overall agricultural sector as well as its wheat sector. One probable explanation 
of this divergence may be that there is a strong tendency among developing countries 
to tax their exportable commodities, and to tax them rather heavily (Krueger, pp. 
165). Such effects of the export/import nature of the commodity are analyzed in 
more detail in Section IV. 
The graphical depiction of the relationship between the producer protection 
levels and GNP per capita exhibits a positive logarithmic correlation (Figure 8). The 
exhibit reveals that the protection awarded to the agricultural producers increases at 
a decreasing rate with the increase in GNP per capita. Countries like Japan and 
South Korea, which are outliers, tend to heavily subsidize their agricultural sector 
with average protection levels for the period 1982-87 at 61 % and 72%, respectively. 
The consumer support levels (Figure 9), on the other hand, reveal a negative 
correlation with the level of GNP per capita. Rich countries tend to tax their food 
consumers while low-income countries subsidize their consumers. Apart from the 
GNP per capita, the share of agriculture in the national income is also instrumental 
in defining the patterns of agricultural protection across countries as discussed below. 
ffi.2 Importance of Agricultural Sector in National Income 
The importance of agriculture in the national income is another factor 
influencing the level of agricultural protection. The level rises as the share of 
agriculture in the gross domestic product (GDP) declines (Honma and Hayami). A 
simple graphical representation of the relationship between the share of agriculture 
in GDP and the level of producer support reveals a negative correlation (Figure 10). 
Countries where income from agriculture constitutes substantially lower proportion of 
the GDP tend to highly protect their agricultural sector. For example, Japan, where 




















































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































to the agricultural sector is about 72 %. Jn countries like the U.S. and Canada, 
where share of agriculture in GDP accounts for only 2-3%, the protection level varies 
between 25-35%. As the share of agriculture increases to roughly above 25%, the 
countries tend to start trucing their domestic agricultural producers. The low-income 
countries, like Nigeria, where GDP from agriculture is about 30%, the agricultural 
sector is truced at an average of 8%. 
The negativity of the relationship between the share of agriculture in GDP and 
producer protection levels is more accentuated in case of some individual 
commodities like milk. Industrialized countries tend to heavily subsidize the ir milk 
producers while the opposite is true for developing countries. 
ID.3 The Regression Analysis 
Tables 7 through 11 present the results of regression analysis aimed at 
determining the explanatory power of the GNP per capita and the share of 
agriculture in GDP in relation to the overall and commodity-wise protection levels 
across countries. The casual observations from the tables and graphs presented 
above are supported by empirical analysis that policy regimes of advanced economies 
tend to assist agriculture relative to other sectors while poor countries tend to 
discriminate against agriculture. For the purpose of identifying patterns across 
homogeneous groups of countries, the analysis was performed at three levels: for all 
industrialized as well as developing countries; industrialized countries; and developing 
countries. However, the data limitations did not allow such classification throughout 
the analysis for milk and rice. 
The PSE and CSE levels for all commodities were regressed against GNP per 
capita (GNPC) and the share of agriculture in GDP (GDPAG) as well as the share 
of agriculture relative to the share of industry (RGDPAG) in the GDP (Table 7). As 
is shown in the table, the regression coefficients for GNP per capita were 
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producer protection levels. Moreover, the explanatory power of the model increased 
(from 20% to 25%) with the logarithmic specification of the regression model. 
Second, the regressions using share of agriculture in GDP as the explanatory variable 
also had the statistically significant and correct negative sign. The explanatory power 
of the model was also improved when both GNP per capita and the share of 
agriculture in GDP were used as independent variables. The model specification 
with relative share of agriculture also had the expected negative sign with an 
explanatory power of 11 %. As the importance of agriculture relative to industry in 
GDP declines, agriculture sector tends to be able to obtain more protection. 
Regression models were also specified separately for industrialized and 
developing countries. The model for developing countries seems to perform better 
than the industrialized countries in that the coefficient of determination is 
considerably higher as well as the regression coefficient is significant at 1 % level of 
significance. The intercept term in the model specified for developing countries turns 
out to be negative, as expected, while that for industrialized countries is positive, 
again, as expected. 
On the side of consumers, the level of consumer support drops significantly as 
GNP per capita increases. In this case too, the model with logarithmic specification 
performs better in terms of the explanatory power of the model. The results support 
the hypotheses that the consumers in developing countries are subsidized while they 
are taxed in the case of industrialized countries (Byerlee and Sain). Table 8 provides 
the results for the regression models using GDP per capita as an explanatory variable 
instead of GNP per capita. As is evident from the table, the results obtained are 
similar to those for GNP per capita. However, some qualitative variables, for 
industrial (DIND), East Asian (DEASIA) and Northern European (DNEURO) 
countries were introduced to isolate the effects of their country-group characteristics. 
A slope dummy variable was also specified for industrialized countries (DIND x 
GDPC). The results are very robust in that the explanatory power of the models 
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Table 7: The influence of GNP per capita and share of agriculture in national 
economy on the level of agricultural protection across industrialized 
and developing countries: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations 
PSE (All Commodities) • 






-64.5337 + 10.324 lnGNPC ' 
(6.6375) 
33.2620 - 1.2618 GDPAG' 
(-6.4977) 
21.0558 - 13.8730 RGDPAG' 
(-4 .()<)77) 
21.3095 + 0.0014 GNPC" - 0.8870 GDPAG' 
(2.3370) (-3.5570) 
13.5110 + 0.0017 GNPC" 
(1.7627) 
-14.2038 + 0.0151 GNPC' 
(4.4484) 
CSE (All Commodities)• 
All Countries: 4.0334 - 0.0019 GNPC' 
(-3.6600) 
46.8970 - 7.001 Ln GNPc' 
(-4.2800) 
-5.2474 - 0.0013 GNPC" + 0.3613 GDPAG 
(-1. 7587) (1.2728) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are 1 - values. 
Ri OF No. of 
Countries 
0.20 130 22 
0.25 130 22 
0.25 130 22 
0.11 130 22 
0.28 129 22 
0.08 34 6 
0.17 94 16 
0.13 88 15 
0.17 88 15 
0.15 87 15 
a PSE and CSE averages are for all commodities and the commodity bundles may differ across 
countries. 
•, ** Statistically different from zero al the 1 % and 5 % level of significance, respectively. 
Sources: GNP figures are from fMF, l111erna1ional Financial Statistics, various issues. GDPAG figures 
are from various issues of Worl.d Development Report, Worl.d Bank. The PSE and CSE figures are 
averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equiva/ems: 1982-87 
and OECD (1991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivale111s: 1979-90. 
Variables: GNPC: GNP Per Capita (USS); GDPAG: Share of Agriculture in GDP; RGDPAG: 
Relative Share of Agriculture in GDP to Industrial Sector. 
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Table 8: The influence of GDP per capita and qualitative variables on the level of 
agricultural protection across industrialized and developing countries: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations R 2 OF No. of 
Countries 
PSE (All Commodities)" 
ALI Countries: 1.4855 + 0.0027 GDPC' 0.20 130 22 
(5.6704) 
-13.6129 + 0.0142 GDPe' + 30.4271DIND" - O.OU9 DTND x GDPC' 
(4.6406) (4.9954) (-3.9315) 
0.29 128 22 
Industrialized 13.0811 + 0.0010 GDPe' + 45.7564 DEASIA' 0.80 39 7 
(3.0348) (12.3160) 
Developing -13.6129 + 0.0142 GDPC' 0.17 94 16 
(4.3284) 
CSE (All Commodit..ies)" 
All Countries: 3.7630 - 0.0018 GDPC' 0.13 88 l5 
(-3.5780) 
PSE Wheat 
lad ustrialized 2.5123 + 0.0031 GDPC" 0.15 34 6 
(2.4958) 
-3.4452 + 0.0027 GDPC' + 62.1119 DEASIA' + 25.3006 DNEURO' 
(7.3623) (12.6200) (6.4066) 
0.77 62 11 
Note: Figures in parentheses are r - values. 
a PSE and CSE for all commodities are weighted averages and the commodity bundles may diffe r 
across countries. 
• , • • Statist..ically different from zero al the 1 % and 5 % level of significance, respectively. 
Sources: GDP figures are from IMF, lmerna1io11al Financial Staristics, various issues. PSE and CSE 
figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Esrimares of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 
1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalenrs and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 
1979-90. 
Variables: GDPC: Gross Domest..ic Product per capita in U.S. $; DINO, DEASIA, and DNEURO are 
qualitative variables for industrialized, East Asian and Northern European countries, respect..ively. 
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increased significantly- the coefficient of determination values obtained were as high 
as 0.80. 
In the case of wheat, the regress.ion coefficients for GNP per capita as well as 
for share of agriculture in GDP and a combination thereof are highly significant 
(Table 9). The explanatory power of all models increases substantially ( up to 44%) 
over the models prescribed for the overall protection levels, given in the previous 
table. This highlights the significance of studying individual commodities separately 
rather than the study of agricultural sector as a whole. Again, the intercept terms 
turn negative in case of developing countries in comparison to that for industrialized 
countries, as expected. The model for explaining the consumer protection levels 
indicated a negative relationship between the GNP per capita and consumer subsidy. 
As GNP per capita increases, the wheat consumers tend to be taxed more heavily as 
compared to the overall agricultural sector. 
The regression results for milk and rice, given in Tables 10 and 11, 
respectively, also support the previous findings about the relationship between the 
level of producer and consumer protection and the wealth of the country. In both 
cases, improvement in results is observed in terms of the coefficient of determination 
with the logarithmic functional form. However, in the comparison of the results of 
the analysis for individual commodities as well as the overall agricultural sector, it is 
revealed that industrialized countries tend to highly subsidize their dairy sector, 
followed by wheat and rice sectors, respectively. The model specification for milk 
sector turns out to be surprisingly robust in that the R2 coefficient ranges from 44% 
to 61 %. Also, as shown graphically in Figure 10, the protection levels for milk are 
substantially more sensitive to the changes in the share of agriculture than the 
protection levels for the agricultural sector as a whole, as indicated by the steeper 
slope of the milk protection line. This signifies that producer protection for milk is 
elastic with respect to the importance of agriculture in national income. 
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Table 9: The innuence of income on the level of protec tion for wheat producers and 
consumers across indu5trialized and developing countries: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations Ri DF No. of 
Countries 
PSE 
All Countries: 3.3110 + 0.0036 GNPC' 0.36 15-t 26 
(9.3300) 
-97.3770 + 15.5485 In GNPC' 0.40 154 26 
(10.2020) 
49.5790 - 1.8900 GDPAG' 0.35 148 25 
(-8.9100) 
28.2000 + 0.0021 G NPC' - 1.2066 GDPAG' 0.41 147 25 
(3.7700) (-4.4300) 
11.9096 + 0.0032 GNPC' - 15.0990 RGDPAG ' o.~ 135 23 
(6.73-W) (-3.9860) 
Industrial 
Countries: 4.6470 + 0.0034 GNPc' 0.31 64 11 
(5.3000) 
D t;vcloping 
Countries: -20.8291 + 0.0222 GNPC' 0.27 88 15 
(5.6700) 
CSE 
All Countries: 36.5183 - 0.0047 G NPC' 0.27 130 22 
(-7.0 100) 
Nole: Figures in parentheses are / - vaJucs. 
• StatistieaJly differeol from zero al l % level of significance. 
Var iables: G NPC: GNP Pe r Capita (US $) ; G DPAG: Share of Agricullure in GDP; and RGD PAG: 
Relative Share of Agriculture io GDP lo Industrial Sector. 
Sources: GNP figures are from IMF, lntemarional Financial S1a1is1ics, various issues. GDPAG figures 
arc from various issues of World Development Reporr, World Bank. The PSE and CSE figures arc 
averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1982-87 
and OECD (199 l )Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivale11ts and Consumer Subsidy Equimlems: 1979-90. 
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Table 10: The influence of income on the level of protection for rice producers and 
consumers acros.s industrialized and developing countries: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimaled Equations Rz DF No. of 
Countries 
PSE 
All Countries: -19.4750 + 0.0061 GNPc' 032 88 15 
(6.4890) 
-143.4550 + 20.8600 ln GNPc' 0.39 88 15 
(7.4250) 
57.8260 - 2.6300 GDPAG' 0.37 88 15 
(-7.1600) 
21.9450 - 22.6720 RGDPAG' o.u 88 15 
(-3.3900) 
30.4730 + 0.0027 GNPC" - 1.7962 GDPAG' 0.39 87 15 
(1.9130) (-3.1680) 
CSE 
All Countries: 3.5990 - 0.0041 GNPC' 0.21 76 13 
(-4.5110) 
100.6700 - 16.1301 ln GNPC' 0.32 76 13 
(-5.9510) 
-54.9140 + 1.9581 GDPAG' 0.26 76 13 
(5.1216) 
-32.4846 + 18.7833 RGDPAG' 0.11 76 13 
(2.9900) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are r - values. 
•, • • Statistically different from zero at the 1 % and 5 % level of significance, respectively. 
Sources: GNP figures are from IMF, International Financial Starisrics, various issues. GDPAG figures 
are from various issues of World Developmem Repon, World Bank. The PSE and CSE figures arc 
averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87 
and OECD (I991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1979-90. 
Variables: GNPC: GNP Per Capita (US$); GDPAG: Share of Agriculture in GDP; RGDPAG: 
Relative Share of Agriculture in GDP to Industrial Sector. 
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Table 11: The influence of income on the level of protection for milk producers and 
consumers across industrialized and developing countries: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations Rz DF No. of 
Countries 
PSE 
All Countries: 17.3%7 + 0.0034 GNPc' 0.56 94 16 
(11.0012) 
-65.6012 + 13.3369 In GNPc' 0.44 9-l 16 
(8.5792) 
70.6891 - 2.4022 GDPAG' 0.48 88 15 
(-8.9449) 
25.0492 + 0.0033 GNPc' - 0.5972 G DPAG ... 0.61 87 15 
(5.5769) (-1.4999) 
65.8128 - 64.3237 RGDPAG' 0.38 88 15 
(-1.2m) 
CSE 
All Countries: -10.7949 - 0.0026 GNPc' 0.16 88 15 
(-4.0612) 
108.1288 - 16.3695 In GNPC' 0.19 88 15 
(-4.5443) 
-34.6362 - 0.0016 GNPC + 1.6958 GDPAG ... 0.21 81 1-l 
(-1.1681) (1.4392) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are / - values. 
•:•• Statistically different from zero at the 1 % and 10 % level of significance, respectively. 
Source : GNP figures are from IMF, /nrerruuional Financial S1a1is1ics, various issues. GDPAG figures 
are from various issues of World Developmeru Repon , World Bank. The PSE and CSE figures are 
averages Crom USDA, ERS (1990) Esrimares of Producer and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1982-87 
and OECD (1991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalenrs and Consumer Subsidy Equivalenrs: 1979-90. 
Variables: GNPC: GNP Per Capita (US $); GDPAG: Share of Agriculture in GDP; R GDPAG: 
Relative Share of Agriculture in GDP to Industrial Sector. 
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In conc1usion, there seems to be a strong evidence of a positive correlation 
between GNP per capita and GDP per capita and the protection awarded to 
theoverall agricultural sector. This relationship is even more pronounced when we 
consider protection levels for individual commodities. This analysis explains that the 
society has an income elastic demand for assisting milk and wheat farmers over and 
above tbe aggregate agricultural ector. Moreover, the nature of relationship does 
not seem to be linear in that the logarithmic regression line outperforms the linear 
models as specified in the regression analysis. This contradicts earlier findings that 
GNP per capita and the level of protection are linearly correlated (Herrmann). The 
logarithmic fit reveals that the level of protection generally increases at a decreasing 
rate as a country gets richer. An exception to this observation might be for food 
importing countries which is di cussed in the next section. Overall, the performance 
of the models suffered when only the relative share of agriculture to industry in the 
GDP was included as a regression variable. 
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CHAPTER JV. TRADENATUREOF COMMODITIES AND THE 
LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
Although it seems plausible to assume that the import/ export nature of a 
particular commodity would also be influential in the determination of its protection 
level, most quantitative studies so far have ignored this aspect altogether (Gardner; 
Balisacan and R oumasset; Anderson, Hayami and Honma; Honma and Hayami). In 
this section, import dependence (IMPDEPW) and self-sufficiency ratios 
(SSRATIOW) are used to determine the effects of the import/export nature of the 
wheat commodity on the protection levels awarded across 26 industrialized and 
developing countries. 
IV .1 Import Dependence of Wheat 
Import dependence is defined as the percentage share of wheat imports in the 
sum of domestic wheat production and wheat imports.4 Table 12 cla sifies the 
selected countries according to the extent of wheat import dependence and the level 
of producer protection for wheat. Industrialized countries with high level of wheat 
import dependence, like Japan and Northern European countries of Norway, 
Finland, and Switzerland heavily subsidize their wheat farmers. The traditional wheat 
exporter countries like Canada U.S.A, Australia, Austria, Sweden and EC-10, where 
import dependence coefficient for wheat is either zero or substantially low, have 
positive albeit lower levels of wheat protection rate. The newly industrialized 
countries of South Korea and Taiwan, where the wheat import dependence is above 
99%, the wheat producers are highly protected with wheat PSE levels at 58% and 
66%, respectively. 
This pattern also holds true in the case of middle income countries. While 
4 
The domestic production data used includes cxpons. 
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Table 12: The influence of wheat import dependence upon wheat protection levels: 
1982-87 
Level of Import 
Dependence• 
Wheat Protection Level 
Industrialized Countries 
High Dependence 
(Above 20 %) 
Low Dependence 
(Below 20 %) 
High 
(PSE > 45%) 
Finland, Japan 
Norway, Switzerland 
Newly Industrialized Countries 
High Dependence Taiwan 
(Above 20 %) S. Korea 
Low Dependence 
(Below 20 %) 
Middle Income Countries 
High Dependence Poland 
(Above 20 % ) Brazil 
Low Dependence 
(Below 20 %) 
Low Income Countries 
High Dependence 
(Above 20 %) 
Low Dependence 
(Below 20 %) 
Low 





S. Africa, Mexico 
Turkey, Yugoslavia 
Negative 






a Import dependence is defined as the percentage share of wheat imports in the sum of domestic 
wheat production and imports. 
Sources: Import dependence variable is based upon own calculations using the USDA, ERS (1991) 
PS&D View '91: Users Manual and Database. For protection levels, the data were obtained from 
USDA, ERS (1990), Estimates of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems:J982-
87''; OECD (1991), Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy Equivalems:J979-90. 
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countries like Poland and Brazil, with high levels of import dependence for wheat, 
heavily protect their wheat producers (PSE ranging from about 50% to 62%), 
countries with lower wheat import dependence have relatively lower levels of 
protection. A major wheat exporting country like Argentina heavily taxes its wheat 
sector (PSE at -30%). Krueger (1989) and Krueger, Schiff and Valdes (1988) also 
found that there is a strong tendency to tax the exportable commodities and to tax 
them rather heavily. Analyzing protection patterns across 18 developing countries, 
the authors argue that direct intervention in exportable commodities by way of export 
taxes etc. points to a strong trend towards heavily taxing exportable commodities. 
Similar results are also reported in de Gorter and Tsur (1991). An explanation of 
this pattern might be found in the importance of these commodities in revenue 
generation and also has a dampening effect on domestic consumer prices, thus 
facilitating accessibility to food for poor consumers in these countries. All low 
income countries included in the present study with low levels of import dependence 
(India, Pakistan and China) tax their wheat producers. The lowest producer rates 
are reported to occur in countries where most of the wheat commodity is 
domestically supplied (Byerlee and Sain). In countries like India, Pakistan, China 
and Argentina where wheat import dependence is about less than 10%, the wheat 
producers are invariably taxed since their wheat protection levels range from -5% to -
35%. 
Countries with a high import dependence ( > 50%) that lie above the import 
dependence line protect their wheat farmers heavily while those below the import 
dependence line tax theirs (Figure 11). This result also supports the findings 
reported by Herrmann. The countries lying above the line also happen to be 
industrialized countries while those below are mostly low-income countries. The 
slope of the trend lines fitted for industrialized economies indicates relatively greater 
emphasis put on this variable in their domestic policies. This observation is also 






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































lV.2 The Regression Analysis 
The regression results for all models have tbe correct anticipated positive signs 
and regression coefficients for import dependence are significant at the 1 % lcvd of 
significance. However, the results a re more robust for industrialized countries as 
compared to the results for the group of all countries or developing countries; the 
coefficient of determination increases dramatically from 7% to 55%. This highlights 
the fact mentioned above that the wheat import dependence variable is highly 
influential in the determination of protection leve ls for wheat in industrialized 
countries. AJso, it seems that food security concerns are also overriding in case of 
these countries- an issue that requires further research. The results for developing 
countries also have the correct signs and are statistically significant at the 1 % level, 
but the R 2 drops to 0.10. The intercept terms in all three regressions show the 
relative average level of wheat producer protection in case of all, industrialized, and 
developing countries at zero level of import dependence. 
When the wheat import dependence variable is regressed against whea t 
consumer protection levels, the correlation interestingly is also positive, highlighting 
the fact tha t import dependent countries like South Korea, Bangladesh, Nigeria, Chile 
and Poland no t only subsidize their wheat farmers but also their wheat comumers. 
One plausible explanation for this result may be found in the analysis of relationship 
of the per capita calorie intake from wheat as well as percentage expenditures on 
food with the protection levels which is the focus of next section. 
The second multiple regression model specification in T able 13 uses, along 
with import dependence in wheat, the GNP per capita and share of agriculture in 
GDP. Protection awarded to wheat increases in countries with higher GNP per 
capita, share of non-agricultural sector in GDP and the import dependence. The 
results substantiate the observed patterns of protection in industrialized countries. 
For example, Japan, with high per capita incomes, high level of import dependence in 
wheat and relatively small share of agricultural sector in the total economy, has 
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producer protection levels as high as 100% for wheat. 
JV .3 Self-Sufficiency in Wheat 
Another substitute for the import dependence variable in the study of the 
trade nature of commodity is the self-sufficiency ratio of that commodity (Herrmann). 
Self-sufficiency ratio for wheat is defined as the ratio of domestic production of 
wheat to the sum of imports and domestic production. Thus, the self-sufficiency 
ratio seems to be inversely correlated to the import dependence variable and hence 
the results in this section merely corroborate the findings given above. The wheat 
seclor will be protectPd more, the lower the degree of self-sufficiency (Herrmann), 
Table 13: The influence of the extent of import dependence• of wheat on 
producer and consumer protection levels: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations 
P E Wheat 
All Countries 18.6310 + 0.2955 IMPDEPW' 0.07 
(3.4592) 
23.5984 + 0.3988 IMPDEPW" + 0.0020 GNPC' - 1.5340 GDPAG' 0.56 
(6.0656) (4.5044) (-6.3828) 
Industrialized 37.0549 + 0.6738 IMPDEPW" 0.55 
(83263) 
Developing 1.2596 + 0.3166 IMPDEPW" 0.10 
(3.2070) 
CSE Wheat 
All Countries -8.8561 + 0.3785 IMPDEPW' 0.05 
(2.7369) 














a Import dependence is defined as the percentage share of imports in the sum of domestic 
production and imports of that commodity. 
• Statistically different from zero at the 1 % level of significance. 
Variables: IMPEDW: Import Dependence of Wheal. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Es1ima1es of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87 and OECD (199l )Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalems and 
Co11sumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. rmport depeodeoce figures are based upon own compulalions 
using the dala from USDA, ERS (1991) "PS&D View '91 : Users Manual and Database•. 
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thus depicting a negative correlation as shown in Figure 12. Countries that a re elf-
sufficient in wheat tend to protect their wheat farmers less than the countrie with 
lower self-sufficiency ratios (Japan, S. Korea, Taiwan, Norway, Brazil, Switzerland 
etc.). The regression results in Table 14 are similar to those presented in Table 13 
for import dependence although the coefficient sign for self-sufficiency ratios turns 
opposite, as expected. The notion of self-sufficiency seems to carry more weight for 
industrialized countries (R2 =0.55). Th.is issue warrants further investigation, specially 
with respect to consumer food security issues; as further discussed in Section VII. 
The majority of quantitative studies aimed at explaining the patterns of 
agricultu ral protection levels have so far ignored the importance of the trade nature 
Table 14: The influence of self-sufficiency ratio of wheat• on producer 









48.1816 - 29.5506 SSRATIOW' 
(-3.4592) 
104.4350 - 67.3801 SSRATIOW' 
(-83263) 
32.9178 - 31.6582 SSRA TIOW' 
(-3.2070) 
28.9948 - 37.8509 SSRA now· 
(-2.7369) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are 1 - values. 
Ri DF No. of 
Countries 
0.07 154 26 
0.55 58 10 
0.10 94 16 
0.05 130 22 
a The Self-sufficiency ratio of wheat (SSRA TIOW) is defined as domestic wheal production 
divided by the sum of domestic wheal production and imports. 
• Statistically different from zero at 1 % level of significance. 
Variables: SSRATIOW: Wheal Self-Sufficiency Ratio. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimares of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equimlellfs a11d 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1979-90. Self-sufficiency figures are based upon own computations using 
the data from USDA, ERS (1991) PS&D View '91: Users Manual and Darabase. 
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of the commodity in question. It might not have had been possible to include trade 
characteristics in majority of these studies since the focus there was mainly on the 
aggregate agricultural sector and not on individual commodities like wheat as 
attempted in this section. The results presented in this section show that the 
countries with high level of wheat import dependency tend to protect their wheat 
sectors heavily. This pattern is even more accentuated when only industrialized 
countries are considered. These results bold even when the import dependency 
variable is substituted by the self-sufficiency ratios highlighting the national food 
security concerns, especially in industrialized countries. 
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CHAYfER V. CONSUMER CHARACTERISTICSOF THE COMMODITY 
Most of the earlier work on the determination of agricultural protect ion 
pat terns bas not concentrated on a product-specific approach but has rather focused 
on an aggregate approach - total agricultural protection. However, as the data 
reveal, protection levels vary significantly across agricultural commodities for any 
given country (Herrmann) - producers of rice and wheat are taxed in India, whi le 
rapeseed and peanut growers are provided subsidies (USDA). Aggregating 
protection levels across commodities, therefore, would render the results less 
meaningful (Gautam et al.). Also, it bas been reported that the lowest producer 
prices occur in countries where wheat is a staple food and vice-versa (Byerlee and 
Sain). In this section, therefore, an attempt is made to determine the impact of 
characteristics of individual food commodities on the level of protection awarded to 
them. These characteristics are exhibited by variables such as the per capita calorie 
intake from the commodity, its share in total calorie intake (the indicator of the 
staple food nature of the commodity) as well as the percentage expenditure on food 
(the Engel Coefficient). It has been shown by Balisacan and Roumasset that as per 
capita income grows and budget share for the food expenditures falls, the sensitivity 
of consumer welfare decreases with respect to changes in the price of food. 
The farm policy in the United States has consistently supported some 
commodities such as wheat, sugar, rice and dairy products, while, at the same time, 
important commodities such as soybeans, poultry and hogs have received little 
protection (Gardner, 1990). Similarly, in India, while wheat producers and oilseed 
consumers are taxed, wheat consumers and oilseed producers, on the other hand, are 
subsidized. These differences in protection levels may be due to various factors like 
importance of the commodity in the food consumption of the people, export/ import 
nature of the commodity, group size of producers of the commodity as well as their 
geographical dispersion etc. The next section concentrates on one of these plausible 
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factors, namely, the importance of the commodity in people's diet. 
V.1 Importance of Commodity in Food Intake 
Olson (1988) stresses that the extent of price distortion varies from one 
agricultural commodity to another - there is more distortion in dairying than in beef 
production and more in rice production than in soybeans. This pattern is discernible 
in exhibits throughout this study that compare overall agricultural protection rates 
with individual commodities like wheat, milk and rice. Figure 13 and 14 show that 
the protection levels for individual commodities like wheat and milk tend to be 
significantly highly sensitive to the changes in per capita income of consumers. This 
also reveals that not all commodities would receive the same level of protection and, 
hence, studying the agricultural sector as a unit would obscure the results and the 
sensitivity analysis would be less meaningful. Further, the protection levels for 
commodities that form the important food group in a country (for example wheat and 
milk in the U.S.) tend to be different than for the commodities that do not (for 
example, hogs, poultry or oats). 
When the relationship between the share of wheat in total calorie intake per 
day per capita is plotted against wheat producer protection, the log-regression trend 
line tends to be downward sloping indicating that as the percentage of calorie intake 
from wheat increases, protection awarded to wheat producers tends to decline 
(Figure 15). However, the results are less meaningful intuitively when the regression 
line includes all industrialized and developing countries since, as is shown in the 
figure, the percentage intake from wheat is similar for India and Norway, Japan and 
Bangladesh etc. although their wheat protection levels differ by about 100% and 
130%, respectively. An implication for further research might be to include some 
qualitative variables for the countries according to their GNP per capita etc. or to 
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V .2 Engel Coefficients 
It has been noted that as the proportion of personal disposable income spent 
on food decreases, the protection awarded to agriculture increases. ''The reduction in 
resistance against agricultural protectionism would be reinforced by the Engel's law. 
As the share of food in total consumption expenditure declines, the effect of high 
food prices on the cost of living becomes smaller. Therefore, agricultural 
protectionism becomes more tolerable to consumers as their income rises. At the 
same time, it becomes tolerable to business interests, because the effects of high food 
prices on the cost of living and hence on labor wage rate declines" (Hayami, 1972). 
One of the primary determinants of benefits of investment in opposing agricultural 
protection to the urban consumers is the share of food in total consumption 
expenditure (Balisacan and Roumasset, 1987; Honma and Haya.mi, 1986). As this 
share increases, the stakes for consumers and industrialists in developing countries 
become higher in cheap-food policies where food is a 'wage-good" and constitutes a 
sizeable proportion of total expenditures. Thus, it can be reasonably be argued that 
as the share of food in total expenditures decline, as in the case of industrialized 
countries, the political pressure from urban consumers and industrialists dissipates, 
resulting in higher support for the agricultural sector. These observations are 
explicitly visible from Figure 16 which shows that agricultural producer protection 
tends to be lower for countries where consumption expenditure on food is low. 
When trend lines are fitted for depicting the nature of the relationship across 
industrialized and developing countries between the Engel Coefficient and producer 
and consumer protection levels (Figure 17), a further point of interest, largely 
ignored in studies thus far, is revealed that the consumer protection level is positively 
correlated with the Engel Coefficient. 
V .3 The Regression Analysis 
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Figure 17: Relationship of producer and consumer protection levels with Engel 
Coefficients 
64 
expenditure on food - the Engel coefficient (ENGELCF); total calorie intake per 
capita per day (TOTALCAL); and the share of wheat in total calorie intake per 
capita per day (WHEATCAL) as explanatory variables fo r explaining the overall as 
well as wheat protection levels. The results for explaining overall agricultural 
producer protection (Figure 17) show that as the percentage of expenditure on food 
increases, the protection levels tend to decrease. The parameter estimates for the 
Engel coefficient are statistically significant at 1 % level (Table 15). This implies that 
in poor countries, where a large proportion of income is spent on food, the 
governments try to keep the prices of foodlow by taxing their agricultural producers. 
The results also hold when only developing countries are included in the model 
although the R2 decreases to 0.23. However, in the model for indu trialized 
countries, the sign on the coefficient changes to positive. Nonetheless, this result 
seems to be consistent with the pattern of protection among industrialized countries. 
For example, the share of food in total consumer expenditures is about 13% in the 
U.S. and the overall producer protection level is around 26% whereas the same 
figures are at 16% and 72%, respectively, in case of Japan. Similarly, in case of 
Switzerland where the Engel coefficient is 17%, the wheat protection level is more 
than 75%. Hence, the positive sign on the Engel coefficient seems to reflect these 
patterns correctly. 
The coefficients with the total calorie intake also had the correct signs for all 
the three groups of countries and were statistically significant at the 1 % level. As the 
total calorie intake increases in the diets of the people, they seem to acquiesce to 
higher levels of farm protection. However, within industrialized countries, the higher 
the total calorie intake in the diet of individuals, the lower the protection awarded to 
the agricultural sector and vice-versa. Moreover, fo r this group, the R2 improves to 
0.56. This seems to significantly explain the facts as mentioned above since countries 
like Japan where total calorie intake is much lower than, say, the U.S., the level of 
protection is much higher. A further point of research interest would be to explore 
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Table 15: Relationship of Engel Coefficients and calorie intakes with producer 
D ependent Variable 




CSE All Commodities• 
All Countries 
and consumer protection levels: 1982-87 
Estimated Equations 
48.8099 - 1.1005 ENGELCF' 
(-7.4842) 
-49.1464 + 0.0213 TOTALCAL' 
(4.3565) 
-39.5749 + 5.3176 ENGELCF' 
(3.8065) 
237.4293 - 0.0610 TOTALCAL' 
(-6.6065) 
59.3763 - 1.3178 ENGELCF' 
(-5.2913) 
-48.1077 + 0.0195 TOTALCAL' 
(3.1916) 
-30.9926 + 0.7680 ENGELCF' 
(4.6054) 











Note: Figures in parentheses are t - values. 










a PSE and CSE are averages for all commodities and the commodity bundle may differ across 
countries. 
*,** Statistically different from zero at 1 % and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
Variables: ENGELCF: Engel Coefficients -- Defined as the share of food consumption in total private 
consumption expenditure; and TOTALCAL: Total Calorie Intake Per Capita Per Day. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer a11d 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalems and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. ENGELCF are from The World Bank, World Development 
Report , various issues; TOTALCAL are from FAQ, Food Balance Sheets: 1984-86Average. 
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the relationship by introducing a binary variable for Japan. 
Another aspect of agricultural protection that has received scant attention so 
far is the impact of these variables on the protection received by the consumers, 
rather than producers alone (Binswanger and Scandizzo; Honma and Hayarni). In 
case of consumer protection l.evels, the parameter estimates obtained for the 
percentage expenditure on food have the correct sign which is statistically significant 
at the 1 % level and the model explains about 19% of the variation. As expenditure 
on food increases, subsidies provided to consumers increase, as is the case for most 
developing countries. Also, as the total calorie intake in the diet increases, 
consumers are less likely to be supported, as is the case for most industrialized 
countries. 
In order to examine the effects of other nutrient measures such as protein 
intakes per day per capita, regression analysis was done to determine any differences 
in their explanation of protection awarded. Table 16 presents the results form these 
regressions using protein intakes from cereals (PROTEINCR), from wheat 
(PROTEINWH) and from meat (PROTEINMT) as the explanatory variables. Since 
dietary habits in East Asian countries like Japan and South Korea differ significantly 
from other industrialized countries, qualitative variables such as intercept dummy 
(DEASIA) and slope dummies (DEASIA x PROTEINCR and DEASIAx 
PROTEINMT) were also used. 
As the protein intake from cereals increases, the protection awarded to the 
agricultural sector as a whole declines, as depicted by the first model in the table. 
Intuitively, protein intake from cereals is higher in developing countries as compared 
to industrialized countries. In industrialized countries, the main source of protein are 
animal products, whereas, in developing countries, protein from cereals accounts for a 
major portion in the daily diet. Therefore, since protection levels are generally 
higher in industrialized countries, the PSE and protein intake from cereals would be 
negatively correlated across countries. 
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Table 16: Relationship of protein intakes with producer protection levels: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable 







28.5969 - 0.4573 PROTEINCR .. 
(-2.0750) 




29.0555-0.5398PROTEINCR" +53.4177 DEASIA' 0.34 
(-2.4796) (7.0710) 
-20.4305 + 2.3660 PROTEINCR. 0.28 
(3.9518) 
91.5208 - 3.2778 PROTEINWH' 0.63 
(-8.2564) 

















26.3971 + 1.2698 PROTEINCR. + 44.2858 DEASIA x PROTEINCR' 
(8.6372) (8.7284) 
0.65 39 7 
50.3350 - 0.7554 PROTEINMT. + 2.7601 DEASIA x PROTEINMT' 
(-2.8052) (3.4563) 
0.79 39 7 
27.6272 - 0.4823 PROTEINWlf". 0.02 124 21 
(-1.6129) 
42.2117-0.8409 PROTEINCR. +61.3108 DEASlA° 0.34 117 20 
(3.1254) (6.5671) 
111.3753 - 4.1403 PROTEINWH. 0.53 40 7 
(-6.7352) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are t - values. 
a PSE are averages for all commodities and the commodity bundle may differ across countries. 
*,**,***Statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Variables: PROTEINCR, PROTEINWH and PROTEINMT are protein intakes/day/capita from 
cereals, wheat and meat, respectively. DEASIA is the dummy for East Asian countries. 
Sources: The PSE figures are from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalems: 1982-87 and OECD (1991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalems: 1979-90. Data on protein intakes are from FAO, Food Balance Sheets: 1984-86Averages. 
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In developing countries, food policies that ensure accessibility to food for 
consumers with low purchasing power, generally result in lower average prices 
received by farmers (Higman, 1985; Chisholm and Tyers, 1982). Since, wheat and 
other cereals are the main source of protein in the daily diets of people in developing 
countries, growers of these receive substantially lower protection as compared to 
farmers in industrialized countries. 
The dietary patterns in East Asian countries reveal a higher protein intake 
level from cereals including rice and lower intakes from wheat and meats, and the 
significance of qualitative variables used for these countries in the analysis fo r 
industrialized countries reaffirms these patterns. Given the relatively higher level of 
protection in case of these countries, a negative correlation is observed with protein 
intake from wheat and meat but positive correlation with protein from cereals. 
These results also substantiate the results presented in table 15. 
Table 17 presents the results for all industrialized and developing countries for 
an individual commodity: wheat. As expected, an increase in the percentage 
expenditure on food is associated with a decrease in the protection level awarded to 
wheat producers. This corroborates the data for countries like India, Pakistan, 
Nigeria etc. where wheat producer prices are kept at relatively lower levels in order 
to subsidize their wheat consumers. This finding further implies that there should be 
a positive correlation between the Engel coefficient and the level of subsidy to wheat 
consumers. This in fact is confirmed from the regression equation explaining the 
consumer protection levels where the coefficient is highly significant with an R 2 value 
of 0.30. The relationships between the wheat protection levels and total calorie 
intake; total calorie intake from wheat; and the percentage share of wheat in total 
calorie intake also have the expected signs and are statistically significant. 
This section further highlights the importance of studying individual 
commodities in the determination of agricultural protection levels. Important food 
commodities, like milk and wheat, are highly sensitive to changes in per capita 
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Table 17: Relationship of Engel Coefficients and calorie intakes with protection 
levels for wheat producers and consumers: 1982-87 
Dependent Variable Estimated Equations R2 DF No. of 
Countries 
PSE Wheal 
AIJ Countries 70.5544 - 1.5016 ENGELCF' 0.39 154 26 
(-9.9306) 
-81.1771 + 0.0355 TOTALCAL' 0.20 154 26 
(6.1154) 
41.3129 - 0.0246 TOTALWHT" 0.04 154 26 
(-2.5888) 
51.5998 · 1.2264 WHEA TCAL' 0.12 154 26 
(-4.5513) 
CSE Wheat 
All Countries -54.5610 + 2.1472 ENGELCF' 0.30 130 22 
(7.5035) 
152 .. 2260 - 0.0492 TOTALCAL' 0.18 130 22 
(-5.3212) 
25.5327 - 0.0372 TOTALWHT" 0.03 130 22 
(-2.0986) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are / - values. 
• ,* • SlatisticalJy different from zero al 1 % and 5% level of significance, respectively. 
Variables: ENGELCF: Engel Coefficients -- Defined as the share of food consumption in total private 
consumption expenditure; TOTALCAL: Total Calorie Intake Per Capita Per Day; TOTALWHT: Total 
Calorie Intake From Wheat Per Capita Per Day; WHEATCAL: Percentage of Calories From Wheat in 
Total Calorie Intake Per Capita Per Day. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) EsrimaJes of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivale111s and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. ENGELCF are from The World Bank, World Development 
Repon , various issues; TOTALCAL, WHEATCAL and TOTALWHT are ta.ken from FAO, Food 
Balance Sheers: 1984-86Average. 
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incomes of consumers. Moreover, the cross-commodity differences in protection 
levels tend be associated with tbe importance of the commodity in the food basket of 
the consumers. Another significant contribution of the analysis, which has largely 
been ignored in studies thus far, is that the consumer protection level is positively 
correlated with the Engel coefficient and is negatively correlated with the total 
calorie intake. As the total calorie intake in the diet of people increases, and as their 
percentage expenditure on food decreases, consumers seem to acquiesce to higher 
levels of farm protection. 
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CHAPTER VI. GROUP SIZE EFFECTS ON AGRICULTURALPROTECTION 
VI. I Share of Agriculture in Labor Force 
Olson highlights the importance of the physical size of the group as well as the 
collective action by the group in the determination of agricultural protection. The 
agricultural sector in many developing countries has been persistently truced even 
though the rural population is substantially larger than the urban consumers which 
have consistently been subsidized (de Gorter and Tsur). The situation is just the 
opposite in case of industrialized countries where less than 3% of the population is 
successful in securing farm policies that redistribute income to farmers from the other 
97% (Gardner). Olson (1986) argues that rural sector in low-income countries is 
exploited because the large and dispersed members of this sector can neither 
organize themselves adequately nor exercise sufficient pressure on the government to 
act on their behalf. While, on the other hand, in industrial countries, it is the urban 
sector that is large and dispersed and, hence, is exploited to benefit the more 
organized, and smaller, rural sector. 
Politically successful groups tend to be small relative to the size of the 
groups truced to pay their subsidies. The opposition of taxpayers to subsidies 
decreases as the number of taxpayers increases and this may well explain why farmers 
in rich countries and urban dwellers in poor countries are politically successful 
(Becker, 1983). Gardner, while contesting the influence of group size on the 
protection levels, cites examples of farm groups of various sizes in the U.S. that have 
been successful in obtaining protection (sugar, dairy, peanut, wheat etc.). He 
emphasizes the decline in farm incomes as a more pressing factor in the 
determination of protection levels than the group size alone. 
This pattern of protection is also substantiated graphically by Figures 18 and 
19. The producer protection line shows that as the share of agriculture in total labor 




























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































industrialized countries,where agricultural protection levels are relatively higher, the 
agricultural sector constitutes only about 2-13% of the total labor force; with Japan 
and EC-10 at 11.5% and 12.5%, respectively. These results are consistent with 
Honma and Hayarni's proposed hypothesis that as the share of agriculture in the total 
economy declines, the level of agricultural protection tends to rise. Demand from 
farmers for agricultural protection increases markedly once an economy has reached 
a point where "the incentives for inter-sectoral adjustment are such that the absolute 
number of farmers begins to fall" (Anderson and Hayarni, p. 3). 
On the other band, protection awarded to consumers shows a positive 
rela tionship with the share of agriculture in the labor force. This relationship has so 
far been ignored in the studies of the patterns of agricultural protection. In 
developing countries, where the rural population is much larger, taxing agriculture 
becomes the main source of government resources (Byerlee and Sain). On the other 
band, the disproportionate political power wielded by urban consumers is 
instrumental in keeping the food prices at a relatively lower level as the urban 
consumers and industries demand cheap food and the political market place tends to 
favor them at the expense of the rural people (Schultz; Anderson and Tyers). 
Figure 19, on the other hand, compares the overall protection levels with those 
for wheat and shows higher sensitivity of wheat protection in comparison to overall 
agricultural protection. Wheat producer's group seems to be more effective in 
obtaining protection in industrialized countries while in low-income countries it loses 
out to the general agricultural sector. A subjective division of countries reveals that 
in industrialized countries, the share of agriculture in total labor force tends to be 
less than 13%, while middle-income and low-income countries range from 13-35% 
and above 35%, respectively. The industrial countries, thus, tend to lie on the upper 
extreme of the protection lines while low-income countries are spread along the 
lower half. The results substantiate the earlier findings that as the agricultural group 
size decreases, countries tend to subsidize their farming sector (Honma and Hayami, 
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Figure 19: Influence of commodity group characteristics on agricuJturaJ protection 
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Olson). 
VI.2 Relative Size of Agriculture to Industrial Sector 
As the share of agriculture in terms of employment falls, relative to the 
industrial sector, it makes it easier for the government to acquiesce to farmers' 
demands increased protection (Anderson and Hayami; p. 3). These patterns have 
been analyzed graphically in case of wheat, rice and overall agricultural protection in 
Figure 20. The figu re plots these producer protection levels against the relative share 
of agriculture in employment. Country names are not provided to facilitate clarity 
since three data points refer to each country. AJl countries are subjectively divided 
into three groups according to their GNP per capita: industrial countries with GNP 
per capita exceeding $7000, middle-income from $1501 to $6999, and low-income 
countries with GNP per capita below $1500. A perusal of the figure reveaJs tha t 
industrialized countries are contained within 0-0.4% range of the relative share of 
agriculture in labor force while the middle-income countries lie between 0.5 to 1.6% 
range. The agriculture sector in low-income countries has about 1.6 to 9% share of 
the labor force relative to their industrial sector. Moreover, industrial countries lie at 
the upper left-hand extremes of the protection lines with low-income countries on the 
lower half. 
The figure shows that the protection levels for individual commodities like 
wheat and rice are more sensitive to changes in this variable. Industrialized countrie 
tend to protect their wheat farmers more as compared to their overall agricultu ral 
sector. On the other band, developing countries tend to tax their wheat sector more 
heavily than their overall agricultural sector. As the share of agricultural sector 
declines in the national labor force relative to the industrial sector, the incomes of 
urban consumers tend to rise and their opposition to raising food prices dissipates, as 
in the case of industrialized countries. The overa ll agricultural protection levels also 
tend to increase with the industrial development since, as the number of farmers 
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Figure 20: Influence or relative share of agricultural labor force on producer 
protection levels 
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decreases, it becomes easier for them to organize political lobbying. As per capita 
incomes of the non-farm sector increases with the relative expansion of the industrial 
sector, the per capita burden of assisting the farming sector declines, thereby 
reducingresistance to agricultural protectionism (Hon.ma and Hayarni). 
VI.3 The Regres.sion Analysis 
The regression results explaining the effects of the relative share of agriculture 
to total and industrial labor force on the protection levels for overall agricultural 
producers and consumers as well as wheat producers and consumers are presented in 
Table 18. In the models for overall protection levels, the results are also provided 
for industrial and developing countries separately. 
All regression coefficients for explanatory variables are significant at 1 % level 
and the models reveal a good fit in that the R 2 varied between 0.10 to 0.35. This 
indicates that the share of agriculture to total and industrial labor force is an 
important determinant of the overall and commodity-specific protection levels. 
The coefficients for overall agricultural protection have the correct signs, are 
significant and account for about 20% of the variation in protection levels. As the 
share of agricultural to total and industrial labor force declines, the level of 
protection awarded to agriculture increases indicating the effect of differences in the 
relative group size across countries. This relationship is also exhibited in reality as 
the share of agriculture in Australia is about 5 percent with its overall protection rate 
at 34% while in case of Pakistan, the figures are 57% and -21 %, respectively. 
In the case of industrial countries, the sign on the explanatory variables 
changes to positive reflecting the characteristics of this group of countries. For 
example, in Japan, where the agricultural labor force is about 11.5% of the total, its 
protection level is about 72%, while the figures are 2% and 26%, respectively, in case 
of the U.S. Moreover, the coefficient of determination stays at the 0.20 level. The 
results for developing countries are in conjunction with the results for all countries in 
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Table 18: Group-size impacts on agricultural protection: 1982-87 
Dcpcndeol Variable Estimated Equations Rl DF No. of Countries 
PSE All Commodities• 
All Countries 32.7771 - 0.5730 LFAG' 0.20 130 22 
(-5.7022) 
25.2814 - 6.0609 LFAG/ LFIN' 0.20 130 22 
(-5.6250) 
Industrialized 13.8585 + 2.4539 LFAG' 0.20 34 6 
(2.9175) 
11.3462 + 97.8330 LFAG / LFIN' 0.19 34 6 
(2.8211) 
Developing 25.8125 - 0.4584 LFAG' 0.10 94 16 
(-3.1416) 
17.6504 - 4.5355 LFAG/ LFJN' 0.12 94 16 
(-3.4922) 
CSE AU Commodities 
AU Countries -21.9157 + 0.4577 LFAG' 0.17 88 15 
(4.2366) 
-14.2628 + 4.1854 LFAG/LFJN' 0.14 88 15 
(3.7181) 
PSE Wheat 
All Countries 52.7691 - 0.9720 LFAG' 0.34 154 26 
(-8.9174) 
43.6198 - U.1461 LFAG/ LFIN' 0.35 154 26 
(-9.0849) 
CSE Wheat 
All Countries -28.2431 + 1.3336 LFAG' 0.24 130 22 
(6.4121) 
-11.0477 + 12.0222 LFAG/ LFIN' 0.13 130 22 
(4.3397) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are r - values. 
a PSE for aJ1 commodities represents average commodity bundle which may vary across countries. 
• StatisticaJly different from zero at 1 % level of significance. 
Variables: LFAG: Percentage of Total Labor Force in Agriculture; and LFIN: Percentage of Total 
Labor Force in Industry. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Esrimates of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalems: 1982-87 and OECD (l991)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and 
Co11Sumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. Percentage shares of labor-force in agriculture (LFAG) and 
industry (LFIN) are from The World Bank, World Development Repon, various issues. 
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that the coefficient signs are negative and are statistically significant, although the R 1 
values drop somewhat. 
Although it would have been more consistent to regress the protection level 
for wheat against the share of wheat farmers in the total labor force, but due to the 
lack of availability of such data across countries, the overall share of agriculture was 
used as a close approximation. 5 It is reasonable to believe that if the share of 
agricultural sector as a whole in the total economy declines, so would the number of 
wheat farmers. 
Interestingly, the models for wheat sector are very robust in that the regression 
using this variable in isolation are able to explain about 34-35% of the variation in 
the wheat protection levels. This implies that wheat farmers are awarded higher 
protection levels relative to the overall agricultural sector as the share of agriculture 
in the total labor force declines. 
Another distinguished feature from other studies is that the relative group size 
of agriculture in national economy is also capable of explaining the protection levels 
awarded to agricultural and wheat consumers. The models express that as the size of 
the farming group increases, the consumers are able to obtain higher levels of 
subsidies and vice versa. The coefficients are significant at 1 % level . This is 
consistent with the earlier studies (Olson; Lutz and Scandizzo; Byerlee and Sain). 
Moreover, the models explaining protection levels for wheat consumers are even 
more robust in that the R 2 values are as high as 0.24 indicating significant differences 
in the level of subsidies received by consumers of specific commodities. 
In short, the group size variations have significant effect not only on the level 
of producer protection but also on the level of protection awarded to consumers of 
agricultural commodities. Results show that as the share of agriculture in total labor 
force decreases, protection awarded to agricultural producers increases. On the other 
5 
Some oiher proxy variables like (Wheat Output/ Aggregate Agricultural Output) may also be used, provided that variations in 
average output per farmer arc small. 
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hand, protection awarded to consumers increases with a rise in the share of 
agriculture in labor force. Also, wheat producer group seems to be more efficient in 
obtaining protection in industrialized countries while that in low income countries, it 
loses out to the general agricultural sector. The results in case of individual 
commodities like wheat are much improved, signifying the commodity-specific 
differences in protection levels. This again highlights the need to study the 
determinants of agricultural protection in a commodity-specific framework. 
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CHAPTER VII. FOOD SECURlTY ISSUES AND THE 
LEVEL OF PROTECTION 
VII.l Food Security: An Overview 
Food security for consumers has three dimensions: availability of food at all 
times for all people; accessibility to food; and adequacy of food-supplies (Busch and 
Lacy, 1984). Attaining food security for consumers has been an important goal of 
agricultural protection policies in most of the industrial countries and this objective of 
guaranteeing stable food supplies to consumers has been achieved but at a substantial 
cost to consumers and taxpayers (Miller, 1986). Farm products in industrialized 
countries are generally overpriced and food is expensive (Schultz). Opposition to the 
raising of farm prices from urban workers and industrialists dissipates in developed 
countries for a number of reasons including their fondness towards farmers and their 
attachment to the farming business (Anderson and Tyres). For example, real farm 
prices received by Japanese farmers were more than 7 times greater than those 
received by Niger farmers in 1968-70 (Peterson). The consumers in industrialized 
countries pay prices much higher than would be the case if a free flow of world 
agricultural commodities were allowed (Miller). 
Miller further reported that the overall cost to taxpayers, as consumers of the 
US farm programs in terms of paying higher food prices, range between $3-5 billion 
in the early 1980s to $17 billion in 1985 and up to $30.6 billion in 1986. It is pointed 
that aside from financing the stocks acquired at loan rates, US consumers and 
taxpayers provide direct payments for deficiency payment, acreage control, stock 
disposal programs, export promotion and subsidies. Taxpayer subsidies to US 
farmers represented a contribution of nearly $700 a year by each non-farming family 
in 1986 (Miller). He further reported that the total taxpayer and consumer transfers 
to EC farmers are equivalent to an annual contribution of more than $900 from each 
non-farming family in Europe. However, part of these costs is hidden in prices that 
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consumers pay in the grocery stores (Sanderson, 1990). In Japan, the aggregate cost 
of agricultural protection to taxpayers in 1985 was $10.5 billion and the cost of 
transfer from Japanese consumers was several orders of magnitude higher than the 
taxpayers' transfers. 
Both Japan and EC have also sought to pursue food self-sufficiency. The 
Japanese have encouraged domestic self-sufficiency in order to decrease dependence 
on imported food and consumer prices of food are over 60% higher than they would 
otherwise have been. The Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the EC guarantees 
regular food supplies and ensures "reasonable" prices to consumers, as one of its 
goals. European consumers pay prices for ag. commodities that are considerably 
higher than world prices. The objective of guaranteeing regular supplies to 
consumers in EC have been met but at a high cost to consumers and taxpayers. EC 
consumers pay prices much higher than would be the case if a free flow of world ag 
commodities were allowed into the Community (Miller). Figure 21 provides the 
sources of producer support in six industrialized nations. In the U.S., the major 
portion of the cost of agricultural protection is borne by taxpayers ( 69%) whereas the 
opposi te is true in case of Japan and EC. In Canada, Australia and New Zealand, 
the major bill is picked up by the taxpayers. 
In the United States, the threat of food shortages is not so strong a political 
force as it seems to be in Japan and other food importing countries, but, food 
security is a concern nonetheless. There is a perception that an economically healthy 
agricul ture is a kind of food-supply insurance for consumers, and this contributes to 
support for the protection of agriculture. An explanation of the consumer support for 
agricultural protection in industrialized countries might be found in the belief on the 
part of risk-averse consumers that farm programs guarantee stable food supplies at 
reasonable prices and thus constitute consumer insurance or stabilization programs 
(Gardner). 
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Figure 21: Sources of producer protection support in six industrialized countries 
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of developing and food importing countries. However, there is a close connection 
between food supplies and purchasing power and in industrialized countries where 
people have sufficient purchasing power, the food supplies have grown more rapidly 
than demand, while in developing countries, where purchasing power of the people is 
low, the reverse is true (Mellor, 1988). Improving food security in the developing 
countries requires both increasing the purchasing power of the poor and boosting the 
overall food production, both of which are intertwined and surplus of food provides 
the basis for establishing the food security programs. The stability of food production 
is essential for achieving security of food consumption, thus, providing the link 
between food security issues and domestic agricultural protection policies. 
VII.2 Relationship of Wheat Protection and Self-Sufficiency in Wheat 
In this section, therefore, an attempt is made to explore the link between the 
self-sufficiency rates and the level of protection for wheat. The self-sufficiency rate is 
defined as the domestic production as a percentage of consumption. Figure 22 is a 
graphical representation of this relationship. As the self-sufficiency rate for wheat 
increases, the protection awarded to wheat producers declines. This explains why the 
wheat protection levels are relatively low in case of wheat exporting countries like 
Australia, Canada and the U.S., while these are substantially higher in case of 
countries with lower self-sufficiency rates like Japan, Switzerland, Norway and 
Finland. A close perusal of the figure reveals that all industrialized countries lie 
above the wheat protection and self-sufficiency interaction line whereas all low-
income countries, where wheat sector is generally truced, lie below this line. 
However, within low-income countries, the countries with higher levels of sufficiency 
























































































































































































































































































VII.3 The Regression Analysis 
The results of the empirical analysis of above observations are provided in 
Table 19. The results show that as the self-sufficiency rate increases, the protection 
awarded to wheat producers, on an average, falls. This result improves tremendously 
when the analysis is done for industrialized and developing countries on a separate 
basis. In the case of industrialized countries, the significance of the coefficient 
increases as the independent variable is able to explain about 49% of the variation in 
wheat protection levels. In case of developing countries, the results are equally 
encouraging with an increase in the parameter estimate. This implies that the 
policies of attaining self-sufficiency in wheat have been relatively more important in 
industrialized nations. 
Fascinatingly, when wheat consumer protection levels are regressed against the 
self-sufficiency rate, the relationship again turns out to be negative. This highlights 
the fact that as self-sufficiency rate increases, the protection awarded to wheat 
consumers falls. For example, in India where self-sufficiency rate is about 100%, the 
consumer protection level is 22% (and wheat producers are truced at 35% rate), 
while in case of Nigeria which is only about 2% self-sufficient in wheat, its consumer 
subsidies amount to about 156% (and wheat producers are subsidized at about 1 % 
level). In case of industrialized countries, where self-sufficiency is extremely high 
(Canada, Australia, U.S.A.), wheat consumers are generally truced. 
To analyze the food security issue, it becomes imperative to look at the 
variance in domestic food production and the accompanying protectionistiC' policies 
followed to ensure food security. Table 20 highlights the relationship between the 
variation in wheat production and the protection awarded to wheat farmers. As 
expected, the sign with the variance of wheat production is positive and significant. 
The more uncertain the domestic production, the higher the level of protection 
awarded to the farmers to ensure adequate supplies and satisfy food security 
concerns. Food security notion undermines the agricultural sector's comparative 
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Table 19: The influence of self-sufficiency rate• of the commodity on the protection 
level awarded to its producers and consumers: 1982-87 
Dependenl Variable Estimated Equal.ions Ri DF No. of 
Countries 
PSE Wheat 
All Countries 33.1095 - 0.0471 SSRATEW'" 0.02 154 26 
(-1.9059) 
Industrialized 72.3585 - 0.1123 SSRATEW" 0.49 58 10 
(-7.4137) 
Developing 31.6650 - 0.2575 SSRA TEW' 0.16 94 16 
(-4.0215) 
CSE Wheat 
All Countries 13.6100 - 0.0893 SSRA TEW" 0.04 130 22 
(-2.3777) 
CSE Rice 
All Countries 11.3206 - 0.2080 SSRATER" 0.31 76 13 
(-5.8678) 
Note: Figures in parentheses are / - values. 
a The Self-sufficiency rate (SSRA TE i) defines domestic production of commodity i as a 
percentage of its domestic consumption. 
*,**,***Statistically different from zero at 1%, 5% and 10% level of significance, respectively. 
Variables: SSRATEW: Self-Sufficiency Rate for Wheat; and SSRATER: Self-Sufficiency Rate for Rice. 
Sources: The PSE and CSE figures are averages from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1982-87 and OECD (199l)Tables of Producer Subsidy Equivalems and 
Consumer Subsidy Equivalents: 1979-90. Self-sufficiency figures are based upon own computations using 
the data from USDA, ERS (1991) PS&D View '91: Users Manual and Database. 
advantage. Honma and Hayami also report that agricultural protection is inversely 
associated with the comparative advantage of agriculture. They further report that 
protection levels are higher in the case of countries with low agricultural productivity 
and efficiency while countries with efficient agricultural sector tend to provide less 
protection to their agricultural sector. Countries like Japan, Sweden, Norway, 
Finland and Switzerland with declining comparative advantage in agriculture,tend to 
highly subsidize their agricultural sector in an aim to achieve self-sufficiency and 
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Table 20: Relationship between variance of production and producer 





24.8807 + 30.4846 V ARPROD2" 
(2.2350) 
7.2624 + 45.1599 VARPROD2' + 42.3807 DIND' 
(3.8324) (7.6757) 
9.9158 + 22.8367 VARPRODI' + 40.9875 DIND' 
(2.6614) (7.2820) 











Variables: VARPRODl: Variance of Wheat Production = {(Y,- "?)/ "? }2 where, Y, is current output 
and Y is the average output for 1982-87; VARPROD2 = {(Y,- "?1•1) / t,.1 } 2 ; and DIND is the dummy 
for industrialized countries. 
Sources: The PSE figures are from USDA, ERS (1990) Estimates of Producer and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalems: 1982-87 and OECD (1991)Tab/es of Producer Subsidy Equivalents and Consumer Subsidy 
Equivalems: 1979-90. 
promote food security. However, the argument that industrial countries also strive to 
achieve the goals of self-sufficiency and food security through their farm programs is 
debatable. The World Development Report (1986) contends that production 
variability need not cause food shortages in industrialized countries since, given their 
resources, they can "always afford to buy enough (food) on world markets". Food 
security, therefore, would imply less specialization in domestic crop patterns and 
more emphasis on the production of staple food commodities. 
The above analysis highlights that attaining self-sufficiency and food security 
have been important policy goals of both industrialized and developing countries. 
However, these concerns seem to be overriding in case of industrialized nations. 
The empirical analysis shows that as a country achieves higher levels of self-
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sufficiency, the protection level awarded to the consumers as well as producers of the 
commodity declines. This result also holds for groups of industrialized and 
developing countries when analyzed separately. However, an interesting future 
research endeavor in this regard would be to analyze theoretically as well as 
empirically whether the risk-averse consumers in industrialized countries acquiesce to 
agricultural protection policies in order to achieve food insurance in terms of surplus 
food production at reasonable prices. 
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CHAYfER vm. SUMMARY 
The treatment of agriculture differs significantly across industrialized and 
developing countries. While agricultural producers in developing countries are 
typically truced, industrialized countries commonly subsidize their agricultural sector. 
However, studies aimed at examining these patterns across industrialized and 
developing countries are relatively few and have been less satisfactory in their 
explanation of variation in protection levels. Moreover, most of the earlier work 
have not taken a product specific approach to the study of these patterns. Since 
protection rates vary from commodity to commodity, a commodity-specific approach 
seems pertinent. Also, the coverage of the determinants of the patterns of 
agricultural protection has been limited in earlier studies. Inasmuch as the protection 
awarded to the producers of an agricultural commodity is also the outcome of 
interaction of the demand characteristics of the commodity, the neglect of the role of 
consumers in the determination of protection levels in most of the earlier studies 
renders their results less comprehensive. 
The present study attempts to identify some major consistent patterns of 
agricultural protection across industrialized and developing countries in a commodity-
specific as well as an aggregative approach. The study is more comprehensive in 
terms of its coverage of the patterns of protection and also concentrates on the 
consumer characteristics of individual commodities like the importance of the 
commodity in daily diet, Engel coefficient and food security issues. However, the 
focus of this attempt is not an in-depth analysis of individual patterns but rather 
identification of some regular patterns especially on the consumer protection levels. 
Unlike earlier studies using nominal protection rates and coefficients for measuring 
the level of intervention, more comprehensive and aggregate measures, namely 
producer subsidy equivalents and consumer subsidy equivalents, are used, since these 
capture transfers from government expenditures as well as from price distortion. A 
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comparative analysis of differnet measures of protection has also been provided. 
There appears to be a strong positive correlation between the GNP per capita 
and the level of agricultural protection for the overaJJ agricultural sector. This 
relationship is more pronounced in case of individual commodities like wheat and 
milk and reflects that the society has an income elastic demand for assisting these 
commodities. On the other hand, the results show that as the level of GNP per 
capita increases, the protection awarded to consumers of agricultural commodities 
falls. The results also show that the agricultural sector is heavily protected in 
countries where income from agriculture constitutes substantially lower proportion of 
GDP. 
The trade nature of individual agricultural commodities is also shown to 
influence their respective protection levels. Countries with high level of import 
dependency in wheat tend to protect their wheat sectors heavily. This pattern is 
accentuated when the group of industrialized countries is considered separately. 
These results hold even when the import dependency variable is substituted by the 
self-sufficiency ratios highlighting the national food security concerns. Whea t 
consumer protection, on the other hand, tends to rise with the increase in the import 
dependence of wheat and falls with the increase in self-sufficiency ratio of wheat. 
The level of overall agricultural protection increases as the percentage of 
expenditure on food declines. In poor countries, where a large proportion of income 
is spent on food, the governments try to keep the food prices low and thus tax their 
agricultural producers. In case of consumer protection levels, as expenditu"re on food 
decreases, as is the case in industrialized countries, the protection awarded to 
consumers falls. It was also found that the consumer protection levels are negatively 
correlated with total calorie intake. These results improve significantly in the 
commodity-specific analysis. 
Another distinguishable feature from earlier studies is the finding that the 
relative group size of agriculture in national economy is capable of explaining not 
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only the producer protection levels but also the protection level awarded to the 
consumers of agricultural products, especially wheat. The results point out that as 
size of farming group increases, consumers are able to obtain higher levels of 
subsidies and vice-versa. The results in case of individual commodities are much 
improved, signifying the commodity-specific differences in protection levels and 
highlighting the need to study the patterns of agricultural protection in a cornmodity-
specific framework. 
Food security issues are also incorporated in this study since the stability of 
food production is essential for achieving food security, thus necessitating the 
examination of the link between food security and food production policies. As the 
self-sufficiency rate for wheat increases, the protection awarded to wheat producers 
as well as consumers declines. These results improve when the analysis is performed 
separately for industrialized countries indicating their overriding food security 
concerns. The results also show a positive relationship between the variation in 
production and the protection awarded to wheat producers. 
However, due to lack of data availability across countries, issues like 
geographical dispersion and its effect on protection could not be analyzed. An 
extension of this work would be to include qualitative variables for groups of 
countries as well as consumer characteristics of commodities; to study the patterns 
identified in this study simultaneously; and to theoretically and empirically analyze 
whether risk-averse consumers in industrialized countries submit to agricultural 
protection policies in order to achieve food insurance in terms of surplus production 
at reasonable prices. 
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